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SHOULD THE MEDIUM AFFECT THE MESSAGE? 
LEGAL AND ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS 
OF PROSECUTORS READING 
INMATE-ATTORNEY EMAIL 
Brandon P. Ruben* 
 
The attorney-client privilege protects confidential legal communications 
between a party and her attorney from being used against her, thus 
encouraging full and frank attorney-client communication.  It is a venerable 
evidentiary principle of American jurisprudence.  Unsurprisingly, 
prosecutors may not eavesdrop on inmate-attorney visits or phone calls or 
read inmate-attorney postal mail.  Courts are currently divided, however, 
as to whether or not they can forbid prosecutors from reading inmate-
attorney email. 
This Note explores the cases that address whether federal prosecutors 
may read inmates’ legal email.  As courts have unanimously held, because 
inmates know that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) monitors all their email, 
their legal email is unprivileged.  In addition, all courts have rejected the 
argument that prosecutors reading inmates’ legal email impermissibly 
restricts inmates’ Sixth Amendment right of access to counsel.  Accordingly, 
despite questioning the practice’s propriety, four courts have ruled that 
there is no legal basis to prevent prosecutors from reading inmate-attorney 
email.  Two courts, however, pursuant to no clear authority, prevented the 
prosecutors from doing so. 
This Note argues that prosecutors should abstain from reading inmate-
attorney email as a matter of self-regulation because this behavior 
unjustifiably chills inmate-attorney communication.  In addition, this Note 
asserts that BOP’s email monitoring policy unconstitutionally restricts 
inmates’ Sixth Amendment right of access to counsel, a challenge 
prisoners’ rights advocates have yet to bring.  In cases where BOP’s email 
monitoring policy is not at issue, or where a court seeks to avoid a 
constitutional decision, this Note concludes that courts should prevent 
prosecutors from reading inmates’ legal email by exercising their delegated 
authority to enforce Rules of Professional Conduct.  Specifically, courts 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, 2016, Fordham University School of Law; M.A., 2010, Columbia 
University; B.A., 2007, McGill University.  Special thanks are due to Professor Bruce A. 
Green for guiding me throughout this project.  For reading earlier drafts, I thank Professors 
Michael B. Mushlin and Julian Arato as well as Yahshuah A. Ford, Esq. I also thank my 
family for their encouragement.  Most of all, I thank my wife Lianna for her love and for 
always inspiring me. 
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should invoke Rule 8.4(d), which prohibits attorneys from engaging in 
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine the following scenario:  you are a busy defense attorney and one 
of your many clients is detained in federal prison awaiting trial.  She is 
accused of a crime but presumably innocent and you are doing all you can 
to defend against the U.S. government’s impending attempt to deprive her 
of her liberty.  To communicate with her, the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) 
allows you to make in-person visits.1  If you account for travel time and 
security clearance, however, these can consume the better part of your 
workday.2  BOP also provides for confidential postal mail,3 though physical 
mail’s inefficiency makes it a patently unattractive option.  In addition, 
BOP allows you to arrange for confidential legal phone calls.4  Depending 
on the cooperativeness of the correctional officer you deal with, however, 
arranging one can take as long as a month.5 
To provide for more efficient inmate communications, since 2006 BOP 
has enabled inmates to send and receive email via the Trust Fund Limited 
Inmate Computer System (TRULINCS).6  Assuming your client is 
computer literate, this would be your best choice, by far, to communicate 
with her day-to-day.  There is, however, just one catch:  in order to use 
TRULINCS your client must sign a form acknowledging that BOP 
 
 1. 28 C.F.R § 543.13(b) (2012) (“The Warden generally may not limit the frequency of 
attorney visits . . . [which are to] take place in a private conference room, if available . . . .”). 
 2. See infra note 293. 
 3. 28 C.F.R. § 540.18(a) (“The Warden shall open . . . special mail only in the presence 
of the inmate for inspection of . . . contraband . . . .  The correspondence may not be read.”). 
 4. Id. § 540.102 (“The Warden shall notify an inmate of the proper procedures to have 
an unmonitored telephone conversation with an attorney.”). 
 5. See infra note 293. 
 6. See generally TRULINCS Topics, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, http://www.bop.gov/ 
inmates/trulincs.jsp (last visited Feb. 23, 2015). 
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monitors all her emails, including her legal emails.7  In turn, any email she 
sends or receives is not protected by the attorney-client privilege and, as 
four courts have ruled, fair game for the prosecution to read and use as 
evidence against her.8 
“That’s hogwash,” a judge in the Eastern District of New York 
exclaimed during a recent pretrial conference discussing this issue.9  The 
rebuke followed an Assistant United States Attorney’s statement that the 
government had “no interest” in reading inmate-attorney emails and would 
“do their best not to” when reviewing the PDF file of all the defendant’s 
emails BOP provides the government upon request.10  As the prosecutor 
explained, the government used to assign a team of staff members to 
segregate defendants’ legal emails from their personal emails, but this 
practice became too expensive.11  The government’s decision to read 
inmate-attorney email, the prosecutor thus emphasized, was motivated by 
administrative necessity as opposed to the desire to gain a strategic 
advantage.12 
To the judge, the prosecutor’s remarks appeared particularly 
disingenuous given that his office recently issued a letter to the Federal 
Defenders of New York for the Eastern District declaring, “emails between 
inmates and their attorneys . . . are not privileged and [the U.S. Attorney’s 
Office for the Eastern District of New York] intends to review [them].”13  
“In this case,” the judge proclaimed, “the government will be precluded 
from looking at any of the attorney-client emails, period.”14 
When the transcript of this proceeding became public, the mainstream 
and legal media denounced the government’s decision to read inmate-
attorney emails as a “draconian and Kafkaesque” violation of the attorney-
 
 7. FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, INMATE AGREEMENT FOR PARTICIPATION IN TRULINCS 
ELECTRONIC MESSAGING PROGRAM § 2(D) [hereinafter BOP’S EMAIL MONITORING POLICY], 
available at http://www.bop.gov/policy/forms/BP_A0934.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2015) 
(“Consent to Monitoring.  I am notified of, acknowledge, and voluntarily consent to having 
my messages . . . read . . . by Bureau staff . . . .  I am notified of, acknowledge, and 
voluntarily consent that this provision applies to messages both to and from my 
attorney . . . and that such messages will not be treated as privileged communications.”). 
 8. See infra Part I.A–B, D, F. 
 9. Transcript of Criminal Cause for Status Conference Before the Honorable Dora L. 
Irizarry at 17, United States v. Ahmed, No. 1:14-cr-00277 (E.D.N.Y. June 27, 2014) 
[hereinafter Tr. of Ahmed Conference], available at http://kmbllaw.com/documents/ 
CorrlinksPrivilegeHearing.pdf. 
 10. Id.  As the government has explained elsewhere, BOP provides them a single PDF 
document containing all emails an inmate has sent and received via TRULINCS, including 
those to and from her attorney. Response in Opposition re:  34 First Motion in Limine re:  
Defendant Emails to Counsel at 2, United States v. Walia, No. 1:14-cr-00213 (E.D.N.Y. July 
16, 2014). 
 11. See infra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 12. See infra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 13. Letter from James G. McGovern, Chief, Criminal Div. of the U.S. Att’y for the 
E.D.N.Y. to Peter Kircheimer, Att’y-in-Charge, Fed. Defenders of N.Y. for the E.D. 1 (June 
9, 2014) (on file with author) [hereinafter McGovern Letter], available at 
http://nylawyer.nylj.com/adgifs/decisions14/072214letter.pdf. 
 14. Tr. of Ahmed Conference, supra note 9, at 21. 
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client privilege.15  Two subsequent rulings from the Eastern District of New 
York, however, deemed the practice perfectly legal, if not commendable, 
because federal inmates are on notice that all their emails—including legal 
emails—are monitored and therefore unprivileged.16 
This Note assesses the recent rulings (which this Note will refer to as 
“the email cases”) that have divided on whether BOP’s email monitoring 
policy17 gives the government carte blanche to read inmates’ legal email.  
After summarizing these cases, this Note explores in succession the four 
major issues they have evoked:  (1) why inmates’ legal emails are not 
privileged,18 (2) whether prosecutors should nevertheless abstain from 
reading them as a matter of self-regulation,19 (3) whether prosecutors 
reading inmate-attorney email is unconstitutional,20 and (4) whether courts 
possess independent authority to forbid them from doing so.21 
Part I summarizes the six cases that have addressed the issue of a 
prosecutor reading an inmate-defendant’s legal email.  Part II begins by 
describing the attorney-client privilege generally.22  It then explains why 
these cases have unanimously held that it does not apply to inmates’ legal 
email.23  Part III explores the concept of prosecutorial self-regulation and 
considers both sides of the argument surrounding whether prosecutors 
should abstain from reading inmates’ legal email even though it is 
unprivileged.  It concludes that they should because doing so unjustifiably 
chills inmates’ ability to communicate confidentially with their counsel. 
This Note then explores the arguments defendants have made in 
opposition to prosecutors who have chosen to read, or threatened to read, 
their legal email.  Part IV examines the defendants’ argument that the 
prosecutors’ acts of reading their legal email impermissibly restrict their 
Sixth Amendment right of access to counsel.24  This part notes that all 
courts in the email cases have rejected the defendants’ constitutional 
claims.25  It asserts, however, that this is because the defendants have 
attacked the individual prosecutors’ acts as opposed to BOP’s email 
 
 15. Marlisse Silver Sweeney, Prosecutors Read Jailhouse Emails to Attorneys, L. TECH. 
NEWS (July 24, 2014), https://advance.lexis.com (within “Browse Sources” search for Law 
Technology News; then follow “Get Documents” link; then search for article’s title); see 
also, e.g., Editorial, Privacy for Prisoners:  Inmates Have a Right to Attorney-Client 
Privilege, Even in Email, WASH. POST, Aug. 31, 2014, at A20; Editorial, Prosecutors 
Snooping on Legal Mail, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2014, at A26. 
 16. Opinion and Order at 2–3, United States v. Asaro, No. 1:14-cr-0026 (E.D.N.Y. July 
17, 2014) [hereinafter Asaro Order]; Memorandum and Order re 25 Motion in Limine As to 
Tushar Walia at 28–29, United States v. Walia, No. 1:14-cr-00213 (E.D.N.Y. July 25, 2014) 
[hereinafter Walia Order]. 
 17. See EMAIL MONITORING POLICY, supra note 7. 
 18. See infra Part II. 
 19. See infra Part III. 
 20. See infra Part IV. 
 21. See infra Part V. 
 22. See infra Part II.A. 
 23. See infra Part II.A–C. 
 24. See infra Part III.A. 
 25. See infra Part III.C. 
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monitoring policy.26  Part IV concludes that constitutional challenges to 
prison regulations require courts to apply stricter standards of review under 
which BOP’s email monitoring policy impermissibly restricts inmates’ right 
of access to counsel.27 
Despite this seemingly meritorious challenge, Part V explains that the 
inquiry does not end here.  In future litigations, as in the email cases, courts 
may seek to avoid rendering a constitutional decision as they often do.28  
Part V discusses delegated and non-delegated powers federal courts employ 
to independently regulate prosecutorial conduct they deem improper.29  In 
the email cases, courts have divided over whether they can apply these 
powers.  This part asserts that courts can and should prevent prosecutors 
from reading inmates’ email pursuant to their delegated authority to enforce 
Rules of Professional Conduct.30  Specifically, Part V concludes, courts 
should invoke Rule 8.4(d), which prohibits attorneys from engaging in 
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.31 
I.   THE EMAIL CASES:  WHEN PROSECUTORS READ, OR THREATEN TO 
READ, AN INMATE-DEFENDANT’S LEGAL EMAIL 
This part briefly summarizes the six cases to address a prosecutor reading 
an inmate-defendant’s legal email. 
A.   United States v. Fumo 
In 2009, Vincent J. Fumo, a former Pennsylvania state senator, was 
sentenced to fifty-five months in federal prison for charges relating to fraud, 
tax evasion, and obstruction of justice.32  The government subsequently 
appealed, requesting a lengthier sentence based partially on an “explosive 
trove” of crude emails Fumo sent via TRULINCS to people he knew, 
including his attorneys.33  Ultimately, the court resentenced Fumo to an 
additional six months in prison, citing the emails as evidence that he was 
unwilling to accept responsibility for his crimes.34 
B.   FTC v. National Urological Group, Inc. 
In 2008, Jared Wheat, an ill-reputed pharmaceutical distributor, was 
enjoined from making statements about his company’s products unless they 
 
 26. See infra Part III.D. 
 27. See infra Part III.D. 
 28. See infra note 231 and accompanying text. 
 29. See infra Part IV.A. 
 30. See infra Part V.C. 
 31. See infra Part V.C. 
 32. United States v. Fumo, 655 F.3d 288, 294 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 33. Id. at 294; see, e.g., Supplemental Reply Sentencing Memorandum and Certificate of 
Service As to Vincent J. Fumo at 7–8, United States v. Luchko, No. 2:06-cr-00319 (E.D. Pa. 
Oct. 28, 2011) (citing emails where the defendant stated, “I do feel Christlike in the injustice 
I have suffered,” compared himself to Jews in concentration camps, and called the jury that 
convicted him “dumb, corrupt, and prejudiced”). 
 34. Transcript Sentencing Hearing Held on 11/10/11 at 47–48, Luchko, No. 2:06-cr-
00319 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 17, 2011), ECF No. 926. 
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were scientifically substantiated.35  From 2009 through 2010, Wheat was 
incarcerated for a separate conviction.36  In 2011, he was held in contempt 
for violating the 2008 injunction by continuing to advertise his products 
with unsubstantiated claims.37  As a major part of their case, the 
government submitted TRULINCS emails between Wheat and his attorney, 
sent during his 2009–2010 prison term that proved that he was aware his 
new advertisements would violate the 2008 injunction.38  The court allowed 
the emails in as evidence and explicitly referenced them in holding Wheat 
in contempt of the 2008 injunction.39 
C.   United States v. Saade 
On February 8, 2011, Maroun Saade was indicted in the Southern District 
of New York for charges relating to aiding and abetting the Taliban.40  At 
an early pretrial conference defense counsel notified the court that she 
received enclosures from the government containing recordings of all of her 
client’s emails and phone calls sent from the BOP facility where he was 
detained.41  After a discussion among the court, prosecutor and defense 
attorney, in which the court expressed its disapproval of the government 
possessing the defendant’s legal emails and calls, the prosecutor stated that 
he would discontinue reviewing the defendant’s legal communications.42 
D.   United States v. Asaro 
On January 23, 2014, Thomas Di Fiore, along with other members of the 
notorious Bonanno crime family, was indicted in the Eastern District of 
New York for charges relating to extortionate collection of credit.43  
Awaiting trial, he was detained at a BOP facility.44  On June 9, 2014, the 
government notified the Eastern District bar, including DiFiore’s defense 
attorneys, that from then on it would be reading all emails inmates send via 
TRULINCS.45  Defense counsel sent a letter of objection to the court46 and 
in reply—unlike in Fumo, National Urological Group or Saade—the 
 
 35. FTC v. Nat’l Urological Grp., Inc., No. 1:04-CV-3294, 2014 WL 3893796, at *1 
(N.D. Ga. May 14, 2014). 
 36. Id. at *3. 
 37. Id. at *4. 
 38. Id. at *4–5. 
 39. Id. (citing emails between Wheat and his counsel that prove Wheat made claims 
“that [his] counsel believed were prohibited”). 
 40. Sealed Indictment, United States v. Saade, No. 1:11-cr-00111 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 
2011). 
 41. Transcript of Proceedings As to Maroun Saade Held on 9/26/2011 at 7, Saade, No. 
1:11-cr-00111 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2011). 
 42. Id. at 9–10. 
 43. Sealed Indictment As to Vincent Asaro, United States v. Asaro, No. 1:14-cr-00026 
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2014). 
 44. Letter Request to Preclude Gov’t from Reading Att’y/Client Email—Redacted As to 
Thomas DiFiore at 4, Asaro, No. 1:14-cr-00026 (E.D.N.Y. July 11, 2014) [hereinafter 
DiFiore Letter]. 
 45. McGovern Letter, supra note 13, at 1. 
 46. DiFiore Letter, supra note 44, at 4. 
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government justified its decision.47  It stated that it used to voluntarily 
assign a “taint team”—or group of staff members not assigned to a given 
case—to redact legal emails from the single PDF of all an inmate’s emails 
BOP provides, but it decided to discontinue this practice because it had 
become an administrative burden.48  The government emphasized that its 
decision to read inmates’ legal email was thus motivated by “practical” as 
opposed to “strategic” concerns.”49  Ultimately, the court issued a written 
order permitting the government to read the defendant’s legal emails going 
forward.50 
E.   United States v. Ahmed 
On May 12, 2014, Dr. Syed Imran Ahmed was indicted in the Eastern 
District of New York for charges relating to Medicare fraud.51  Like the 
defendants in Asaro and Saade, he was detained at a BOP facility prior to 
trial.52  On June 9, 2014, Ahmed’s defense attorney received the same letter 
that defense counsel in Asaro received, regarding the government’s intent to 
review inmates’ legal email, and filed a letter of objection with the court.53  
As in Asaro, the government justified its decision as an administrative 
necessity as opposed to an attempt to gain a strategic advantage.54  At a 
hearing addressing this issue, the court, pursuant to no clear authority, 
explicitly forbade the government from reading the defendant’s legal 
emails.55 
F.   United States v. Walia 
On September 19, 2014, in the Eastern District of New York, Tushar 
Walia was convicted of charges relating to distribution of a controlled 
substance.56  Throughout the course of his trial he was detained, like the 
defendants in Asaro, Saade, and Ahmed in a BOP facility.57  As in these 
prior cases, on June 9, 2014, Walia’s defense counsel received notification 
 
 47. Letter Responding in Opposition to the Defendant’s Application at 1–5, Asaro, No. 
1:14-cr-00026 (E.D.N.Y. July 14, 2014). 
 48. Id. at 5. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Asaro Order, supra note 16, at 3. 
 51. Indictment As to Syed Imran Ahmed, United States v. Ahmed, No. 1:14-cr-00277 
(E.D.N.Y. May 12, 2014). 
 52. Order of Detention As to Syed Imran Ahmed, Ahmed, No. 1:14-cr-00277 (E.D.N.Y. 
Apr. 4, 2014). 
 53. Letter to the Honorable Dora L. Irizarry Respectfully Responding to the Gov’t’s 
June 16 Letter Regarding Emails Sent Between Counsel and Dr. Ahmed Through Bureau of 
Prison’s Email System (TRULINCS) As to Syed Imran Ahmed, Ahmed, No. 1:14-cr-00277 
(E.D.N.Y. June 20, 2014) [hereinafter Irizarry Letter]. 
 54. Letter re:  Emails Through Bureau of Prisons’ TRULINCS System As to Syed Imran 
Ahmed at 5, Ahmed, No. 1:14-cr-00277 (E.D.N.Y. June 16, 2014). 
 55. Tr. of Ahmed Conference, supra note 9, at 21. 
 56. Jury Verdict As to Tushar Walia at 8–9, United States v. Walia, No. 1:14-cr-00213 
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2014). 
 57. Reply to Response to Motion re:  34 First Motion in Limine re: Defendant Emails to 
Counsel at 2, Walia, No. 1:14-cr-00213 (E.D.N.Y. July 22, 2014). 
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of the government’s intent to read his legal email.  He petitioned the court 
to prevent this,58 and the government explained that its decision was 
motivated by the need to conserve resources.59  Like in Asaro, the court 
ultimately issued a written order allowing the government to read the 
defendant’s legal emails.60 
In sum, the Fumo and National Urological Group courts allowed the 
defendant’s legal emails in as evidence61 and the Asaro and Walia courts 
gave the prosecutor permission to read them.62  By contrast, the Saade court 
persuaded the prosecutor to abstain from reading the defendant’s legal 
email,63 and the Ahmed court, which ruled in the same month and in the 
same district as the Asaro and Walia courts,64 explicitly forbade it.65 
The remainder of this Note explores:  why none of these courts found the 
defendants’ legal emails privileged;66 whether prosecutors should 
nevertheless abstain from reading them as a matter of self-regulation;67 
whether it is unconstitutional for prosecutors to read inmate-attorney 
email;68 and whether, apart from the privilege and constitutional issues, 
courts possess independent authority to forbid prosecutors from reading 
defendants’ legal email if they deem this conduct improper.69 
II.   WHY INMATES’ LEGAL EMAIL IS NOT PROTECTED BY THE ATTORNEY-
CLIENT PRIVILEGE 
This part explains why, as courts have unanimously held, inmates’ legal 
email sent via TRULINCS is not protected by the attorney-client privilege.  
Part II.A describes the attorney-client privilege generally and explains that 
it does not attach to communications made in a third party’s presence.  Part 
II.B explains that courts have found inmates’ monitored phone calls 
unprivileged under the theory that the phone recording device is the 
equivalent of a third party.  Part II.C discusses how the email cases have 
relied on this precedent in unanimously holding that inmates’ monitored 
emails are likewise unprivileged. 
 
 58. First Motion in Limine re:  Defendant Emails to Counsel at 2, Walia, No. 1:14-cr-
00213 (E.D.N.Y. June 27, 2014) [hereinafter First Walia Motion]. 
 59. Response in Opposition re:  34 First Motion in Limine re:  Defendant Email to 
Counsel at 3, Walia, No. 1:14-cr-00213 (E.D.N.Y. July 16, 2014) (“[A]s periodic hiring 
freezes . . . drastically reduced the government’s resources, it became too burdensome to 
appoint [additional staff] to every case in which the government requested an inmate’s 
TRULINCS emails.”). 
 60. Walia Order, supra note 16, at 30. 
 61. See supra Part I.A–C. 
 62. See supra Part I.D, F. 
 63. See supra Part I.C. 
 64. Compare Tr. of Ahmed Conference, supra note 9, with Asaro Order, supra note 16, 
and Walia order, supra note 16. 
 65. See supra Part I.E. 
 66. See supra Part II. 
 67. See supra Part III. 
 68. See supra Part IV. 
 69. See supra Part V. 
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A.   The Attorney-Client Privilege and Third-Party Presence 
The attorney-client privilege is a venerable common law rule of 
evidence.70  According to Dean Wigmore, it first appeared in the mid-
sixteenth century as a “natural,” “unquestioned” exception to testimonial 
compulsion.71  Today, the attorney-client privilege maintains its “exalted 
place in our jurisprudence;”72 it is recognized in every U.S. jurisdiction.73  
As the U.S. Supreme Court famously articulated, its purpose is to 
encourage “full and frank” attorney-client communication, thereby 
promoting “broader public interests in the observance of law and 
administration of justice.”74 
In defining the attorney-client privilege, federal courts frequently utilize 
the definition Dean Wigmore proposed.75  Alternatively, the Second Circuit 
employs the following pithy formulation:  “the attorney-client privilege 
protects communications (1) between a client and his or her attorney 
(2) that are intended to be, and in fact were, kept confidential (3) for the 
purpose of obtaining or providing legal advice.”76 
As commentators note, the justice system does not view the attorney-
client privilege as absolute because, like all evidentiary privileges, in 
protecting information it impedes the truth-seeking process.77  Accordingly, 
the privilege is generally held not to apply if (1) the communication is 
deemed to have been between a client and someone other than an 
attorney,78 (2) the communication was not confidential,79 or (3) the client 
sought something other than legal assistance.80 
 
 70. FED. R. EVID. 501 (“The common law . . . governs a claim of privilege unless any of 
the following provides otherwise:  the United States Constitution; a federal statute; or rules 
prescribed by the Supreme Court.”); 1 RICE ET AL., ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE 
UNITED STATES § 2:1 (2014) (“We readily acknowledge the importance of the attorney-client 
privilege, which is one of the oldest recognized privileges for confidential communications.” 
(citing Mohawk Indus. Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 108 (2009)). 
 71. 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2290, at 542–43 
(McNaughton rev ed. 1961). But see Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., An Historical Perspective on 
the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CAL. L. REV. 1061, 1070 (1978) (arguing that the 
“recognition of the privilege was slow and halting until after 1800”). 
 72. In re Lott, 424 F.3d 446, 459 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 73. LEONARD ET AL., THE NEW WIGMORE:  A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE § 6.2.4 (2013). 
 74. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). 
 75. Paul R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege:  The Eroding Concept of Confidentiality 
Should Be Abolished, 47 DUKE L.J. 853, 855 (1998) (citing WIGMORE, supra note 71, 
§ 2290, at 554 (“(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal 
adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in 
confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure 
by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be waived.”)). 
 76. United States v. Mejia, 655 F.3d 126, 132 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 77. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Preservation of a Client’s Confidences:  One 
Value Among Many or a Categorical Imperative?, 52 U. COLO. L. REV. 349, 349 (1981); 
Laurence A. Steckman & Richard Granofsky, The Assertion of Attorney-Client Privilege by 
Counsel in Legal Malpractice Cases:  Policy, Privilege, and the Search for Truth in Cases 
Involving Implied Waivers, 45 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 839, 879–80 (2010). 
 78. See, e.g., Velasquez v. Borg, No. 93-15566, 1994 WL 327328, *1 (9th Cir. July 8, 
1994) (concluding that the privilege was not applicable because the inmate did not contend 
that he believed the “jailhouse lawyer” was actually authorized to practice law). 
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The relevant question in the email cases is whether or not legal emails 
inmates know are monitored can be considered confidential.81  Even if a 
party asserts that she intended for a given legal communication to remain 
confidential, courts generally hold her intent to be irrelevant if her conduct 
belies it.82  Thus when a party knowingly discloses information in front of a 
third party, or fails to take reasonable precautions to guard against a third 
party overhearing, courts generally find that confidentiality could not have 
been intended and that the privilege therefore does not attach.83 
B.   Because Courts Consider the Phone Recording Device a Third Party, 
Inmates’ Monitored Phone Calls Are Not Privileged 
At all BOP facilities inmates’ telephone calls may be monitored.84  The 
prison warden is statutorily required to put inmates on notice of this 
policy.85  In addition, all BOP facilities are required to enable inmates to 
place unmonitored legal phone calls.86  These circumstances have called 
into question whether or not a call an inmate places to an attorney on a line 
the inmate knows to be monitored is privileged; federal courts have held 
that it is not.87 
In the email cases, the courts have relied on United States v. Hatcher88 
and United States v. Mejia89 in holding that, like monitored phone calls, 
emails inmates send via TRULINCS are unprivileged.90  In Hatcher, the 
appellant argued that the district court erred in refusing to order the 
government to turn over conversations between cooperating coconspirators 
 
 79. Bower v. Weisman, 669 F. Supp. 602, 606 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that the 
privilege did not apply to defendant’s letter to his attorney because it was left spread out on a 
table in an office’s waiting room and thus not confidential). 
 80. United States v. Horvath, 731 F.2d 557, 561 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding that because 
the privilege “extends only to . . . communications made for the purpose of 
facilitating . . . legal services . . . transferring funds and facilitating transactions . . . were not 
privileged”). 
 81. See infra Part II.B. 
 82. RICE ET AL., supra note 70, § 9:24. 
 83. Id. §§ 6:7, 9:25; see, e.g., United States v. Gann, 732 F.2d 714, 723 (9th Cir. 1984) 
(holding that statements made by a client to his attorney over the telephone while detectives 
were searching his house were not privileged); Prebilt Corp. v. Preway, Inc., No. CIV.A. 87-
7132, 1988 WL 99713, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 1988) (holding that confidential documents 
inadvertently given to opposing counsel during discovery were not privileged because the 
error was due to carelessness). 
 84. 28 C.F.R. § 540.102 (2012) (“The Warden shall establish procedures that enable 
monitoring of telephone conversations on any telephone located within the institution . . . .”). 
 85. Id. (“The Warden must provide notice to the inmate of the potential for 
monitoring.”). 
 86. Id. (“The Warden shall notify an inmate of the proper procedures to have an 
unmonitored telephone conversation with an attorney.”). 
 87. See, e.g., United States v. Mejia, 655 F.3d 126, 132–35 (2d Cir. 2011); United States 
v. Hatcher, 323 F.3d 666, 674 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Mitchell, No. 3:11-CR-
248(S1)-J-34, 2013 WL 3808152, at *12 (M.D. Fla. July 22, 2013); United States v. 
Landers, No. 1:12-CR-88-TWT, 2012 WL 6214627, at *4–6 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 7, 2012); 
United States v. Lentz, 419 F. Supp. 2d 820, 827–28 (E.D. Va. 2005). 
 88. 323 F.3d 666 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 89. 655 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 90. See infra Part II.C. 
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and the government, which took place over a prison line all parties knew 
was monitored.91  The government argued that the conversations were 
protected by the attorney-client privilege and the district court agreed.92  
The Eighth Circuit, however, disagreed—concluding that because the 
“presence of the recording device was the functional equivalent of a third 
party,” the parties could not have expected their conversations to remain 
confidential and therefore the privilege did not attach.93 
In Mejia, the appellant argued that the district court erred in admitting 
part of a prison call he knew was recorded in which he told his sister to tell 
his brother to tell his attorney that he wanted to accept a plea before he was 
indicted.94  The government, citing Hatcher but taking the opposite 
position, asserted that the conversation was not privileged because it was 
made to a third party (i.e., his sister) in the presence of another third party 
(i.e., the recording device).95  The Second Circuit agreed and affirmed the 
district court’s decision to admit the call.96 
C.   Because Courts Consider the Email Monitoring Device a Third Party, 
No Court Has Held That Inmates’ Emails Are Privileged 
In Fumo, the issue of whether the emails defendant sent via TRULINCS 
were privileged was not litigated because defense counsel stipulated to the 
government’s argument that in using TRULINCS, which defendant knew 
was monitored, he had no expectation of privacy and thus “waived the 
privilege.”97  In Saade, the privilege issue was likewise never subject to 
formal legal analysis because the court persuaded the prosecutor to stop 
reading the defendant’s legal emails shortly after the issue was first raised at 
a pretrial hearing.98  In the remaining email cases, the courts, adopting the 
government’s argument, ruled that the emails were unprivileged because:  
(1) the defendants’ were on notice that their emails were monitored, (2) the 
computer monitoring system—like the phone recording device in Hatcher 
and Mejia—is the equivalent of a third party, (3) communications 
knowingly made in front of third parties cannot be confidential, and 
 
 91. Hatcher, 323 F.3d at 674. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Mejia, 655 F.3d at 129. The government sought to introduce this conversation as 
evidence of the appellant’s guilty conscience. Id. 
 95. Id. at 130. 
 96. Id. at 133. 
 97. Transcript Sentencing Hearing Held on 11/10/11 at 93, United States v. Luchko, No. 
2:06-cr-00319 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 17, 2011), ECF. No. 925.  In making this argument, the 
government cited no legal authority in any proceeding or in their brief. Id; Sentencing 
Memorandum and Certificate of Service by USA As to Vincent J. Fumo, Luchko, No. 2:06-
cr-00319 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 28, 2011). 
 98. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.  While the Saade court never claimed the 
emails were privileged, it is the only court to even balk at the suggestion that they are 
unprivileged. Transcript of Proceedings As to Maroun Saade Held on 9/26/2011 at 11, 
United States v. Saade, No. 1:11-cr-00111 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2011) (“[Prosecutor]:  
[A]bove every phone is a warning saying that these are monitored phones, and so that could 
operate as a waiver . . . The Court:  I don’t think you really argue that position.  I don’t think 
your office takes that . . . position.”). 
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(4) confidentiality is required for a communication to be protected by the 
attorney-client privilege.99 
III.   EVEN THOUGH INMATES’ LEGAL EMAIL IS UNPRIVILEGED, 
SHOULD PROSECUTORS ABSTAIN FROM READING IT 
AS A MATTER OF SELF-REGULATION? 
As Part II explained to qualify for the attorney-client privilege, a 
communication must be confidential.100  As the email cases unanimously 
hold, because communications knowingly made in front of third parties are 
not confidential, and because under Hatcher and Mejia prison monitoring 
devices are considered third parties, federal inmates’ email is not 
confidential, as the inmates know it is monitored, and it is therefore 
unprivileged.101  Attorneys may review non-confidential information.  From 
a legally formalistic perspective—as the Fumo,102 National Urological 
Group,103 Asaro104 and Walia105 courts have ruled—there is thus no reason 
why prosecutors may not read inmates’ unprivileged legal email.106 
But as the adage goes, just because one may do something does not mean 
one should.  With respect to the email cases, the Ahmed court seems to have 
felt this way because it forbade the prosecutor, pursuant to no clear 
authority, from reading the defendant’s legal email,107 despite 
acknowledging that the email was unprivileged.108  More significantly, at 
least one prosecutor’s office has voluntarily employed “taint teams” to 
segregate inmates’ unprivileged legal email.109  Further because there have 
been just six cases, from only three jurisdictions to address a prosecutor 
reading an inmate’s legal email,110 which BOP monitors at all of its 
facilities nationwide,111 it is likely that other prosecutors’ offices also 
 
 99. FTC v. Nat’l Urological Grp., Inc., No. 1:04-CV-3294, 2012 WL 171621, at *1 
(N.D. Ga. Jan. 20, 2012) (“Essentially, TRULINCS requires prisoners using the system to 
consent to monitoring and warns that communications with attorneys are not privileged.”); 
Asaro Order, supra note 16, at 1 (stating “TRULINCS communications . . . do not qualify 
for the protection of attorney-client privilege” (citing Mejia, 655 F.3d at 133–35)); Tr. of 
Ahmed Conference, supra note 9, at 5 (“There are certainly admonitions or warnings that 
communications over [TRULINCS] are not privileged.”); Walia Order, supra note 16, at 29 
(“[T]he TRULINCS system does not provide for the communication of privileged 
information” (citing Mejia, 655 F.3d at 133)). 
 100. See supra notes 79–83 and accompanying text. 
 101. See supra Part II.C. 
 102. See supra Part I.A. 
 103. See supra Part I.B. 
 104. See supra Part I.D. 
 105. See supra Part I.F. 
 106. See supra note 10. 
 107. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
 108. See Tr. of Ahmed Conference, supra note 9.  Part V discusses whether federal courts 
possess the authority to regulate prosecutors in this fashion. 
 109. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 110. See supra Part I. 
 111. See TRUNLINCS Locations, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, http://www.bop.gov/ 
inmates/trulincs.jsp (last visited Feb. 23, 2015). 
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choose not to read inmates’ legal email.112  Accordingly, the question arises 
as to whether all prosecutors, as a matter of self-regulation, should abstain 
from reading inmates’ legal email, even if they may read it because it is 
unprivileged. 
This part addresses that question.  Part III.A provides background on 
prosecutorial self-regulation.  Part III.B explains why some prosecutors 
choose not to read inmates’ legal email.  Part III.C explains the arguments 
prosecutors have offered in defense of their decision to read it.  Part III.D 
argues that all prosecutors should abstain from reading inmate-attorney 
email, even though it is unprivileged, because this behavior unjustifiably 
chills confidential inmate-attorney communication. 
A.   Prosecutorial Self-Regulation 
As the American Bar Association (ABA) writes, prosecutors are not 
simply advocates but “ministers of justice.”113  Accordingly, it is their duty 
to “seek justice, not merely convict.”114  This duty encompasses obvious 
directives, such as refraining from prosecuting charges one knows are 
unsupported.115  Perhaps surprisingly, however, another important part of 
this duty is to encourage efforts to remediate “inadequacies and injustices” 
prosecutors detect in “substantive and procedural law.”116 
As Professor Bruce A. Green explains, the idea that a prosecutor is an 
advocate and a quasi-judicial actor partly responsible for the justness of 
criminal proceedings is generally explained by one of two theories:  
(1) because prosecutors have great power to bring criminal charges, they 
must also bear great ethical responsibility, or (2) because prosecutors 
represent and serve the sovereign, they must seek to meet all of the state’s 
objectives, which in the United States emphatically includes fair process.117 
Regardless of what explanatory theory one accepts, prosecutors’ duty to 
seek justice is a concept that appeals to many in the legal profession.118  
Most importantly, as Green and Professor Fred C. Zacharias point out, 
many prosecutors themselves take this notion seriously.119  With respect to 
federal prosecutors, a testament to this is the degree to which they self-
regulate.120  For example, on its own accord, the U.S. Department of Justice 
 
 112. The number of prosecutor’s offices that voluntarily abstain from reading inmate-
attorney email would be valuable data.  Capturing it, however, is beyond this Note’s scope. 
 113. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2014). 
 114. ABA Prosecution Function Standards Standard 3–1.2(c) (2014). 
 115. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(a) (2014). 
 116. ABA Prosecution Function Standards Standard 3–1.2(d) (2014). 
 117. Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors “Seek Justice”?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
607, 625–38 (1999). 
 118. See, e.g., R. Michael Cassidy, (Ad)ministering Justice:  A Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty 
to Support Sentencing Reform, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 981, 983 (2014); Bennet L. Gershman, 
The Zealous Prosecutor As Minister of Justice, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 151, 152 (2011); Fred 
C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice:  Can Prosecutors Do 
Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 49 (1991). 
 119. Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Regulating Federal Prosecutors’ Ethics, 55 
VAND. L. REV. 381, 449–50 (2002). 
 120. Id. at 427. 
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(DOJ) promulgated and maintains the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual (USAM).121  
The USAM is an internal set of policies that state what federal prosecutors 
should and should not do.122  A recent example of DOJ issuing a policy that 
barred a lawful prosecutorial practice for the sake of “enhancing due 
process” is its decision to prohibit prosecutors from including ineffective 
assistance of counsel waivers in plea agreements.123  In DOJ’s own words, 
even though federal courts have uniformly allowed this practice, DOJ 
barred it in furtherance of ensuring that the adversarial system functions 
“fairly, efficiently, and responsibly.”124 
In sum, there are federal prosecutors who take seriously their duty to seek 
justice.  Accordingly, they may voluntarily abstain from a given practice if 
doing so increases fairness, even if it also decreases their ability to secure 
convictions. 
B.   Why Some Prosecutors Choose to Abstain from Reading Inmates’ Legal 
Email 
At least one prosecutor’s office, and likely more, has voluntarily 
employed taint teams to segregate inmates’ unprivileged legal email.125  
This raises the question of why a prosecutor’s office would choose to self-
regulate with respect to this issue.  Though no prosecutor’s office has 
answered this question, answers can be inferred from the arguments that 
defendants and courts have made against prosecutors who choose to read 
inmates’ legal email. 
The first reason a prosecutor’s office would choose not to read inmates’ 
unprivileged legal email is to avoid restricting confidential attorney-client 
communication.  As the defendant in Walia argued, because email is now 
the legal profession’s dominant communicative medium, denying inmates 
the ability to communicate confidentially with counsel via email seriously 
impedes their overall ability to communicate confidentially with counsel.126  
Prosecutors are well aware of the value our legal system places on 
 
 121. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9 (2015), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/ [hereinafter U.S. ATTORNEYS’ 
MANUAL]. 
 122. See, e.g., id. § 9-13.420(E) (“Conducting [a] Search . . . .  [T]o protect the attorney-
client privilege . . . a ‘privilege team’ should be designated, consistent of agents and lawyers 
not involved in the underlying investigation.”). 
 123. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Holder Announces New Policy to Enhance 
Justice Department’s Commitment to Support Defendant’s Right to Counsel, JUST. NEWS 
(Oct. 14, 2014), http://justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-holder-announces-new-policy-
enhance-justice-departments-commitment-suppoet. 
 124. Memorandum from the U.S. Dep’t of Justice to All Federal Prosecutors, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE (Oct 14, 2014), available at http://justice.gov/sites/default/files/press-
releases/attachments/2014/10/15/dept-policy-on-waivers-of-claims-of-ineffective-assistance-
of-counsel.pdf. 
 125. See supra notes 109–12 and accompanying text. 
 126. Reply to Response to Motion re:  34 First Motion in Limine re:  Defendant Emails to 
Counsel at 3, United States v. Walia, No. 1:14-cr-00213 (E.D.N.Y. July 22, 2014); see also 
ABA LEGAL TECH. RES. CTR.,  2 ABA LEGAL TECHNOLOGY SURVEY REPORT:  LAW OFFICE 
TECHNOLOGY 48 (2014) (reporting that 98.3 percent of lawyers surveyed said they use email 
for law-related tasks). 
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confidential attorney-client communication:  there are at least three Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct devoted to its furtherance,127 and the 
Supreme Court proffered “full and frank” attorney-client communication as 
the very behavior the attorney-client privilege is meant to promote.128  A 
prosecutor’s office that chooses not to read inmates’ unprivileged legal 
email is thus likely making this decision, at least in part, in recognition of 
how critically important it is for a client to be able to communicate 
confidentially with her attorney. 
A second, related reason that a prosecutor’s office would abstain from 
reading inmates’ legal email is because the office appreciates the unique 
difficulties inmates face in communicating with their attorneys.  As the 
defendant in Walia argued and the Ahmed court opined, denying inmates 
confidential legal email is particularly detrimental to their overall ability to 
communicate confidentially with counsel because (1) the alternative means 
of privileged communication BOP offers are inefficient, and (2) most 
inmates are represented by public defenders with high caseloads and limited 
resources.129  It is therefore likely that a prosecutor’s office that chooses to 
abstain from reading inmates’ unprivileged legal email does so, at least in 
part, in recognition of the unique difficulty inmates’ face with respect to 
communicating in confidence with their attorney. 
C.   Why Some Prosecutors Choose to Read Inmates’ Legal Email 
Prosecutors in at least three jurisdictions have chosen to read inmates’ 
legal email.130  Only the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of 
New York, however, has provided justifications for its decision.131  As this 
office explained in Ahmed, it decided to read inmate-attorney email because 
it reads inmates’ personal email, and it is too expensive to segregate 
inmates’ legal email from the single PDF of all an inmate’s email that BOP 
provides.132  In other words, for the Eastern District of New York, the 
decision to read inmate-attorney email was motivated by administrative 
necessity.  As the Ahmed court opined, however, it is hard to imagine that 
prosecutors are not also motivated to read inmates’ legal email in order to 
gain greater access to the truth.133 
 
 127. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2014) (enumerating attorneys’ duties 
of confidentiality); id. R. 1.4 (enumerating attorneys’ duties to communicate with their 
client); id. R.4.4(b) (requiring an attorney who receives inadvertently sent information 
pertaining to an adverse party to notify the sender). 
 128. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). 
 129. Reply to Response to Motion re:  34 First Motion in Limine re:  Defendant Emails to 
Counsel at 3, Walia, No. 1:14-cr-00213 (E.D.N.Y. July 22, 2014); Tr. of Ahmed Conference, 
supra note 9, at 18–21. 
 130. See supra Part I. 
 131. See supra Part I.D–F. 
 132. See Tr. of Ahmed Conference, supra note 9, at 10. 
 133. See id. at 17. 
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D.   Prosecutors Should Abstain from Reading Inmate-Attorney Email 
Because This Behavior Unjustifiably Chills 
Inmate-Attorney Communication 
From a legally formalistic perspective, prosecutors may read inmates’ 
legal email because it is unprivileged.134  As ministers of justice, however, 
they should abstain from reading it because this behavior is normatively 
disfavored within the profession, further disadvantages criminal defendants, 
and lacks a compelling justification.  
In recognition of the critical role communicating in confidence with 
one’s attorney plays in the adversary system,135 all the actors involved in 
litigating whether prosecutors can read inmates’ legal email have expressed 
discomfort with them doing so:  obviously, inmates and defense attorneys 
are against it; more significantly, three of the four courts that ruled to allow 
the practice expressed substantial misgivings about it;136 more significantly 
still, until recently the government voluntarily used taint teams to manually 
segregate inmates’ legal email,137 which provides the inference that the 
government itself believes eavesdropping on opposing parties’ legal 
communications is undesirable behavior.138  Thus, while the prosecutors 
can read inmates’ legal email to better their chances of a favorable outcome, 
the normative consensus among actors who have evaluated the issue, 
including the government itself, is that they should refrain from doing so 
because it chills defendants’ ability to communicate confidentially with 
counsel. 
Moreover, as recent commentators note, high rates of pretrial detention 
combined with the threat of draconian mandatory minimum sentences gives 
federal prosecutors nearly plenary power to extract guilty pleas from 
defendants.139  This has pushed federal prosecutors dangerously close to 
becoming defendants’ “inquisitors” as opposed to their adversaries.140  To 
deny federal inmates and their attorneys the ability to use the dominant 
communicative medium of our time to prepare their case only exacerbates 
this troubling power discrepancy. 
Finally, prosecutors should not read inmates’ legal email because their 
decision to do so is not justified by an important legal principle or law 
 
 134. See supra notes 100–06 and accompanying text. 
 135. See supra Part I.A.1. 
 136. See supra note 281 and accompanying text. 
 137. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 138. Indeed, this is exactly what the government argued in Hatcher, where despite the 
government claims of attorney-client privilege the court ruled to admit conversations 
between the government and cooperating witnesses that took place on monitored prison 
lines. See supra notes 92–93 and accompanying text.  As the First Circuit aptly has noted, “it 
is disturbing to see the Justice Department change the color of its 
stripes . . . portraying . . . events variously . . . depending on the strategic necessities of the 
separate litigations.” United States v. Kattar, 840 F.2d 118, 127 (1st Cir. 1998). 
 139. See David Patton, Federal Public Defense in an Age of Inquisition, 122 YALE L.J. 
2578, 2581 (2013) (noting that because of this combination of circumstances only 2.7 
percent of federal cases went to trial in 2010 as opposed to 15 percent in 1963); see also The 
Kings of The Courtroom, ECONOMIST, Oct. 4, 2014, at 33. 
 140. See Patton, supra note 139, at 104. 
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enforcement policy.  Rather, it is an opportunistic choice that exploits a gap 
between technological innovation and established norms in order to save 
money.141  As the Saade court implied,142 and as common sense dictates, 
because over time BOP has successively provided for confidential legal 
visits, legal mail, and legal phone calls,143 it will almost certainly eventually 
provide for confidential legal email.  But while BOP had significant 
financial incentive to provide inmates with email access,144 its only 
incentive to provide confidential legal email is that it is normatively the 
right thing to do.  Because prisoners are an extremely weak political group, 
it is unsurprising that BOP has yet to accommodate this interest.  As the 
ABA suggests, when prosecutors recognize this type of imbalance in the 
criminal justice system they should seek to remediate it.145  At the very 
least, they should not seek to exploit it. 
In sum, while prosecutors can legally read inmates’ legal emails because 
they are unprivileged, as ministers of justice they should refrain from doing 
so as this behavior is disfavored within the profession because it chills 
inmate-attorney communication, further disadvantages inmates, and can be 
explained as a choice to save money by exploiting the fact that BOP has yet 
to apply its established norms to new technology. 
IV.   ARE INMATES’ CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IMPERMISSIBLY RESTRICTED 
WHEN PROSECUTORS READ THEIR LEGAL EMAIL? 
Part II argues that inmates’ legal emails are unprivileged but that 
prosecutors should nevertheless refrain from reading them.  Parts IV and V 
discuss the arguments defendants have made against prosecutors who 
choose to read their legal email. 
This part discusses whether or not prosecutors reading inmates’ legal 
email is unconstitutional.  Part IV.A provides background regarding 
inmates’ Sixth Amendment right of access to counsel which defendants 
have argued prosecutors impermissibly restrict by reading their legal email.  
Part IV.B explains the different standards of review courts employ when 
assessing whether a given action or a prison policy impermissibly restricts 
this right.  Part IV.C notes that all courts have rejected the defendants’ 
constitutional arguments.  Part IV.D asserts, however, that defendants’ 
constitutional claims have been unsuccessful because they have argued that 
the individual prosecutors’ acts of reading their legal email, as opposed to 
BOP’s email monitoring policy, impermissibly restricts their constitutional 
rights.  In contrast with claiming that an act restricts an inmate’s 
 
 141. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 142. See supra note 288 and accompanying text. 
 143. See supra notes 158–59 and accompanying text. 
 144. See FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, TRUST FUND LIMITED INMATE COMPUTER SYSTEM 
(TRULINCS) ELECTRONIC MESSAGING 1 (2009), available at http://www.bop.gov/ 
policy/progstat/5265_013.pdf (describing program objectives as “[t]o provide the Bureau 
with a more efficient, cost-effective, and secure method of managing and monitoring inmate 
communications services” and “[t]o reduce opportunities for . . . contraband to be introduced 
into Bureau facilities through inmate mail”). 
 145. ABA Prosecution Function Standards Standard 3–1.2(d) (2014). 
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constitutional rights, Part IV.D concludes constitutional challenges to 
prison regulations require courts to apply specific, stricter standards of 
review, under which BOP’s email monitoring policy impermissibly restricts 
inmates’ right of access to counsel. 
A.   Inmates’ Sixth Amendment Right of Access to Counsel 
As the Supreme Court has proclaimed, “[p]rison walls do not form a 
barrier” between inmates and constitutional protections.146  Two 
constitutional protections inmates retain are the Sixth Amendment right of 
access to counsel and the right of access to the courts.147  In the email cases, 
defendants have argued, thus far unsuccessfully, that even if their legal 
email is unprivileged, prosecutors cannot read it because doing so 
impermissibly restricts these rights.148 
By its plain text, the Sixth Amendment guarantees an individual accused 
of a federal crime the right “to have the assistance of counsel for his 
defense.”149  In Douglas v. California,150 this right was extended to appeals 
as of right,151 in Massiah v. United States152 the Court recognized the 
special importance of legal assistance during pretrial proceedings,153 and in 
Strickland v. Washington154 the Court explained that assistance of counsel 
means “reasonably effective” assistance.155  For pretrial detainees, convicts 
appealing as of right, and the small percentage of convicts able to retain 
private counsel,156 reasonably effective assistance has been interpreted to 
guarantee at least the right to meet with their attorney in a confidential 
setting.157  At BOP facilities, inmates are entitled to confidential legal 
visits,158 physical mail,159 and phone calls.160 
 
 146. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987). 
 147. See generally 3 MICHAEL B. MUSHLIN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS, §§ 12:1, 12:24 (4th ed. 
2014) (subscription required). 
 148. See infra Part I.C. 
 149. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  This right was reaffirmed in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 
458, 459 (1938).  The Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of assistance of counsel was extended 
to defendants in state courts in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 150. 372 U.S. 353 (1963). 
 151. An appeal as of right, as opposed to by permission, is an appeal a party is statutorily 
entitled to and an appellate court must hear. Compare FED. R. APP. P. 3 (“Appeal As of 
Right”), with FED. R. APP. P. 5 (“Appeal by Permission”). 
 152. 377 U.S. 201 (1964). 
 153. Id. at 205 (calling arraignment through trial “perhaps the most critical period of the 
proceedings” (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932))). 
 154. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 155. Id. at 687. 
 156. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 8 (2009), available at 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs09.pdf (noting that only 21 percent of federal 
defendants retained private counsel).  BOP inmates are entitled to retain private counsel at 
any time. See 28 C.F.R. § 543.12 (2012). 
 157. 3 MUSHLIN, supra note 147, § 12:27. 
 158. 28 C.F.R § 543.13(b) (“The Warden generally may not limit the frequency of 
attorney visits . . . [which are to] take place in a private conference room, if available . . . .”). 
 159. Id. § 540.18(a) (2012) (“The Warden shall open . . . special mail only in the presence 
of the inmate for inspection of . . . contraband . . . .  The correspondence may not be read.”). 
 160. See id. § 540.102l; supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
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Convicted inmates unable to retain private counsel, who have neither the 
right of access to counsel nor the right to appeal, are thus not cutoff from 
the justice system; they retain the related “fundamental” constitutional right 
of access to the courts, which requires prisons to provide for, and ensure 
they do not impermissibly impede, inmates’ ability to bring non-frivolous 
legal claims.161 
B.   Judicial Review of Prison Regulations 
That Restrict Inmates’ Constitutional Rights 
Because prisoners retain constitutional protections, when a given action 
or prison policy threatens an inmate’s constitutional guarantee, federal 
courts will “discharge their duty” to protect it.162  As of publication, 
defendants have not challenged the constitutionality of BOP’s email 
monitoring policy; instead, they have, thus far unsuccessfully, argued on a 
case-by-case basis that the prosecutor’s act of reading their legal email 
impermissibly restricts their right of access to counsel.163   
Federal courts assess whether an action impermissibly restricts an 
inmate’s constitutional right by ascertaining the degree to which the action 
restricted the inmate’s overall ability to exercise the right.164  Barring a 
particularly egregious incident, inmates’ constitutional claims are generally 
dismissed.165 
In contrast with actions that restrict inmates’ constitutional rights, prison 
policies that do so are subject to specific, stricter standards of review.166  
 
 161. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 827 (1977); see, e.g., Al-Amin v. Smith, 511 F.3d 
1317, 1325 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[A] prisoner’s constitutional right of access to the courts 
requires that incoming legal mail from his attorneys . . . may be opened only in the inmate’s 
presence and only to inspect for contraband.”); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996) 
(affirming prisoners’ right of access to the courts as mandating an adequate library or 
adequate assistance from persons trained in law); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 419 
(1974) (holding that a prison policy barring law students and legal paraprofessionals from 
visiting prisoners unjustifiably restricted inmates’ right of access to the courts). See 
generally 3 MUSHLIN, supra note 147, § 12. 
 162. Procunier, 416 U.S. at 406. 
 163. See infra Part III.C. 
 164. These cases are relatively uncommon and are not decided pursuant to a consistent 
standard of review. See, e.g., Zavala v. Rios, No. 1:09-CV-00679-BAM PC, 2012 WL 
1592544, at *3 (E.D. Cal. May 4, 2012) (finding no constitutional violation of an inmate’s 
right to communicate with his attorney when a prison guard failed to return several of the 
attorney’s phone calls); Schick v. Apker, No. 07CIV.57775SHS, 2009 WL 2016926, at *2–3 
(S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2009) (finding no constitutional violation of an inmate’s right of access to 
counsel where he was denied unmonitored phone calls on three occasions); Hall v. McLesky, 
83 S.W.3d 752, 759 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (finding no violation of inmate’s right of access 
to counsel where the inmate was temporarily unable to call his attorney because the prison 
administration was slow in placing the attorney’s name on the approved call list). But see In 
re Roark, 56 Cal Rptr. 2d 582, 589 (1996) (holding that prison officials impermissibly 
restricted the defendant’s right of access to counsel where they required the removal and 
search of his attorney’s prosthetic leg prior to visitation, which the attorney refused to 
comply with); but see also Tucker v. Randall 948 F.2d 388, 390–91 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding 
that denying a pretrial detainee telephone access for four days may be unconstitutional). 
 165. See supra note 164. 
 166. See generally 3 MUSHLIN, supra note 147, § 2:3. 
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Today, Turner v. Safely167 generally governs cases in which a prison 
policy’s constitutionality is at issue.168  In Turner, the Court ruled that a 
prison regulation limiting inmates’ ability to correspond with one another 
did not impermissibly restrict their First Amendment right to free speech, 
but that a regulation requiring inmates to obtain the prison superintendent’s 
permission prior to marrying did impermissibly restrict their right to 
marry.169 
The Turner Court announced that when a prison policy restricts inmates’ 
constitutional rights, it is valid if it is “reasonably related to legitimate 
penological interests.”170  In performing this rational basis review, the 
Court furthered, it is necessary to consider:  (1) whether there is a “rational 
connection” between the regulation and governmental interest, (2) whether 
there are “alternative means” for the inmates to exercise the restricted right, 
(3) the effect accommodating the right will have on prison interests and 
resources, and (4) whether inmates can point to a low-cost alternative to the 
regulation.171  The Supreme Court has not provided guidance as to the 
relative weight of each factor, and lower courts have afforded factors more 
or less importance depending on a given case’s facts.172 
Turner does not, however, govern all cases in which a defendant claims 
that a prison policy impermissibly restricts her constitutional rights.173  The 
court did not apply Turner, for example, in Benjamin v. Fraser,174 a case 
 
 167. 482 U.S. 78 (1987). 
 168. See Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 229 (2001) (“[I]n Turner we adopted a 
unitary . . . standard for reviewing prisoners’ constitutional claims.”); 3 MUSHLIN,  supra 
note 149, § 2.4 (“The four-part Turner v. Safely test . . . has become the default test to use in 
great many prison cases.”). But see Michael Keegan, The Supreme Court’s “Prisoner 
Dilemma”:  How Johnson, RLUIPA, and Cutter Re-defined Inmate Constitutional Claims, 86 
NEB. L. REV. 279 (2007) (analyzing recent departures from Turner); Trevor N. McFadden, 
When To Turn To Turner?  The Supreme Court’s Schizophrenic Prison Jurisprudence, 22 
J.L. & POL. 135 (2006) (also analyzing recent departures from Turner). 
 169. Turner, 482 U.S. at 81.  The right to marry is protected under Zablocki v. Redhail, 
434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
 170. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.  Courts have recognized legitimate penological interests as 
those related to maintaining security, providing for rehabilitation, and conserving resources. 
See 3 MUSHLIN, supra note 147, § 12. 
 171. Turner, 482 U.S. at 90.  The Court reasoned that regulating correspondence was 
reasonably related to institutional security, and monitoring all communications would be 
unreasonably burdensome. Id. at 98.  By contrast, the Court reasoned that requiring 
permission to marry was unrelated to security and prison marriages can be overseen at nearly 
no cost. Id.; see also, e.g., Clement v. Cal. Dep’t. of Corr. 364 F.3d. 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 
2004) (holding policy banning inmates’ receipt of internet-generated material 
unconstitutional under Turner). But see Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 533 (2006) 
(upholding prison regulation under Turner that restricted access to newspapers, magazines, 
and photographs for inmates housed in prison’s most restricted level). 
 172. See 3 MUSHLIN, supra note 147, § 2:9. 
 173. See, e.g., Demery v. Arpaoi, 378 F.3d 1020, 1028–29 (9th Cir. 2004) (refusing to 
apply Turner in case concerning pretrial detainees as opposed to convicts). See generally 
Keegan, supra note 168; McFadden supra, note 168.  Most recently the court explained that 
Turner applies only to rights that need “necessarily be compromised” for proper prison 
administration, such as restrictions on access to the counsel. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 
499, 510 (2005).  By contrast, Turner would not apply to the right not to be discriminated 
against based on one’s race. Id. at 510–11. 
 174. 264 F.3d 175 (2d. Cir 2001). 
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courts in the email cases have relied on in holding that prosecutors reading 
inmates’ legal email does not impermissibly restrict their right of access to 
counsel.175  In Benjamin, the defendants, who were pretrial detainees, 
challenged several prison policies that caused extensive delays for their 
attorneys trying to visit them.176  Defendants brought suit against the 
prison, claiming that its delay-causing policies infringed their right of 
access to counsel and access to the courts.177 
Though the Benjamin court stated that it believed the prison policies 
would fail under Turner,178 it chose to apply the more inmate-friendly 
“unjustifiably obstructs” standard articulated in Procunier v. Martinez.179  
In addition, the court applied a standard specifically for pretrial detainees 
set out in Bell v. Wolfish,180 which states that regulations restricting pretrial 
detainees’ constitutional rights must be evaluated only in light of prison 
administrations’ central objective, namely, “safeguarding institutional 
security.”181  The court reasoned that Turner was inapposite and Procunier 
and Wolfish controlled because the case involved (1) pretrial detainees (at 
issue in Wolfish) and (2) a regulation restricting inmates’ access to counsel 
(at issue in Procunier), neither of which Turner addressed.182  Pursuant to 
this analysis, the court affirmed the trial court’s judgment that the prison’s 
delay-causing policies unjustifiably obstructed the defendants’ right of 
access to counsel.183 
The Benjamin court noted that the prison’s policies implicated 
defendants’ right of access to counsel and access to the courts, but it made a 
point to differentiate the two.184  The difference is meaningful because in 
Lewis v. Casey185 the Supreme Court held that prisoners bringing an access 
 
 175. See infra notes 196–98 and accompanying text.  As Part III.B argues, however, these 
holdings are predicated on a misreading of Benjamin that the government proffered and the 
courts adopted uncritically. See infra notes 207–14 and accompanying text. 
 176. Benjamin, 264 F.3d at 179.  These policies included maintaining a small number of 
counsel rooms and refusing to bring pretrial detainees to counsel rooms during inmate counts 
or without special escort officers. Id. 
 177. Id. at 180. 
 178. Id. at 187 n.10. 
 179. 416 U.S. 396, 419 (1974) (“[Prison] [r]egulations and practices that unjustifiably 
obstruct the availability of professional representation or other aspects of the right of access 
to the courts are invalid.”). 
 180. 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979). 
 181. Id.  This stands in contrast to Turner, which allows a court to evaluate a prison 
policy in relation to any legitimate penological interest. See supra note 170 and 
accompanying text. 
 182. Benjamin, 264 F.3d at 187 n.10.  The Court argued that Turner is inapposite in cases 
involving pretrial detainees because it involved convicted prisoners and promulgated a 
standard predicated on penological interests, which a state does not have with respect to 
persons merely accused of a crime. Id. 
 183. Id. at 190. 
 184. Id. at 186 (“[T]he right to counsel and the right of access to the courts are 
interrelated, since the provision of counsel can be a means of accessing the courts.  However, 
the two rights are not the same.”). 
 185. 518 U.S. 343 (1996). 
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to the courts claim must show “actual injury” to have standing.186  Though 
it is arguable as to whether Lewis’s actual injury requirement applies to 
access to counsel claims,187 the Benjamin court held that it does not because 
access to counsel, unlike access to the courts, is a right that the Constitution 
directly guarantees.188 
C.   Courts Have Not Found That Prosecutors Reading Legal Email 
Is Unconstitutional 
In National Urological Group, Asaro, Ahmed, and Walia, the defendants 
argued that, regardless of whether their legal emails are privileged, the 
government’s decision to read them impermissibly restricts their Sixth 
Amendment right of access to counsel.189  In National Urological Group, 
citing Al-Amin v. Smith,190 the defendant argued additionally that this 
behavior violated his right of access to the courts.191  The National 
Urological Group court ignored the access to the courts claim and 
dismissed the access to counsel claim because, it held the Sixth Amendment 
does not apply in a civil contempt proceeding.192  In Ahmed, despite barring 
the government from reading the defendant’s legal emails,193 the court 
never addressed his access to counsel claim.194  This issue, however, was 
given significant attention by the Asaro and Walia courts.195  Both courts 
acknowledged the burden that the inability to send privileged email places 
on inmates’ ability to consult their counsel.196  The courts held, however, 
that under Benjamin,197 because BOP facilities provide for alternative 
 
 186. Id. at 351 (“Insofar as [access to the courts] is concerned . . . the inmate must 
demonstrate that the alleged shortcomings in the library or legal assistance program hindered 
his efforts to pursue a legal claim.”). 
 187. See 3 MUSHLIN, supra note 147, § 12:23. 
 188. Benjamin, 264 F.3d at 186; see also Lewis, 518 U.S. at 367 (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(noting the Courts historic inability to “agree upon the constitutional source” of the right of 
access to the courts).  As Part III.B argues, the burden of having to prove actual injury makes 
it unlikely that a challenge to BOP’s email monitoring policy under an access to the courts 
theory would succeed. 
 189. FTC v. Nat’l Urological Grp., Inc., No. 1:04-CV-3294-CAP, 2012 WL 171621, at *1 
(N.D. Ga. Jan. 20, 2012); Asaro Order, supra note 16, at 2; Irizarry Letter, supra note 53, at 
2; Walia Order supra note 16, at 29–30.  No constitutional claims were raised in Fumo or 
Saade. 
 190. 511 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 191. Cross Motion to Dismiss the Charges or Motion to Disqualify the F.T.C. Trial Team 
at 4, Nat’l Urological Grp., No. 1:04-CV-03294 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 28, 2011). 
 192. Nat’l Urological Grp., 2012 WL 171621, at *1.  This dismissal was arguably 
improper. See infra note 200. 
 193. Tr. of Ahmed Conference, supra note 9, at 21. 
 194. See generally id. 
 195. Asaro Order, supra note 16, at 2; Walia Order, supra note 16, at 29–30. 
 196. Asaro Order, supra note 16, at 2 (“[T]he court sympathizes with [defendant and 
defense counsel’s] concern that it would . . . be more efficient . . . if their  . . . defense 
preparation could be conducted through privilege-protected emails.”); Walia Order, supra 
note 16, at 29 (“[T]he Court understands and appreciates Defendant’s desire to have quick 
and easy access to his counsel by email.”). 
 197. See supra notes 174–83 and accompanying text. 
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modes of confidential communication, the defendants’ right of access to 
counsel were not “unreasonably burdened.”198 
D.   BOP’s Email Monitoring Policy Impermissibly Restricts 
Inmates’ Right of Access to Counsel 
In the email cases, the defendants’ constitutional arguments claimed only 
that the prosecutors’ behavior, as opposed to BOP’s email monitoring 
policy, restricted their right of access to counsel.199  The National 
Urological Group court dismissed this claim under the theory that the Sixth 
Amendment “does not apply” in civil contempt cases.200  The Ahmed court 
did not respond to the defendant’s access to counsel claim,201 and the Asaro 
and Walia courts, while devoting significant discussion to the defendants’ 
access to counsel claims, ultimately rejected them.202 
In the email cases, the defendants’ constitutional arguments have failed 
because they challenged an action that BOP’s email monitoring policy 
made possible—i.e., the prosecutor reading the defendants’ legal email—as 
opposed to challenging the policy itself.  As Asaro and Walia illustrate, 
courts assess whether an action unconstitutionally restricts an inmate’s 
constitutional rights by, rather amorphously, comparing the degree to which 
the event inhibited her ability to exercise them.203  By contrast, 
constitutional challenges to prison regulations require courts to apply 
specific, stricter standards of review,204 under which BOP’s email 
monitoring policy unconstitutionally restricts inmates’ right of access to 
counsel. 
The Asaro court, citing Benjamin, ruled that because BOP offers other 
means of privileged legal communication, its failure to provide privileged 
email did not unreasonably burden the defendant’s right of access to 
counsel.205  This ruling is confusing because the defendant never 
challenged BOP’s email monitoring policy.206  In addition, this ruling is 
predicated on a plain misreading of Benjamin that the government 
 
 198. Asaro Order, supra note 16, at 2; Walia Order, supra note 16, at 30.  In so holding, 
both courts, arguably, adopted a misreading of Benjamin that the government proffered. See 
infra notes 207–14 and accompanying text. 
 199. See supra Part IV.C.  In National Urological Group, the defendant also argued that 
the government’s behavior impinged his right of access to the courts, which the court 
ignored. See supra note 190 and accompanying text. 
 200. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.  This dismissal was arguably improper.  
While the Sixth Amendment does not guarantee counsel in civil contempt proceedings, 
inmates have the derivative right of access to counsel if they retain an attorney. See supra 
notes 156–59 and accompanying text.  Because assistance of counsel in civil contempt 
proceedings is not directly guaranteed by the constitution, it is likely that the defendant 
would have the added burden of proving actual injury. See supra notes 185–88.  This does 
not mean, however, that the right does not apply. 
 201. See supra note 194 and accompanying text. 
 202. See supra notes 195–98 and accompanying text. 
 203. See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
 204. See supra notes 167–88 and accompanying text. 
 205. Asaro Order, supra note 16, at 2. 
 206. DiFiore Letter, supra note 44, at 3 (only arguing that the “government’s decision to 
read our communications with [the defendant] . . . will frustrate [his] access of counsel”). 
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proffered.207  The Benjamin court stated that it was applying Procunier and 
Bell.208  It merely referred to “unreasonably burdens” as a “similar 
standard” it had adopted in the past and it never mentioned an alternative 
means test.209  The Asaro court thus misguidedly ruled on BOP’s email 
monitoring policy’s constitutionality pursuant to a standard of review, 
which the government derived from a misreading of Benjamin, that was 
intended to respond to the defendant’s argument that the prosecutor’s 
behavior—not BOP’s email monitoring policy—restricted his right of 
access to counsel.210 
In Walia, the government submitted the Asaro ruling,211 and the court 
rejected the defendant’s access to counsel claim pursuant to its logic.212  
The court framed its ruling, however, with respect to the prosecutor 
reviewing the defendant’s legal email; it made no reference to BOP’s email 
monitoring policy.213  Thus, though the Walia court employed the same 
misreading of Benjamin that the Asaro court did, its result was more 
reasonable because the alternative means test it employed accords with 
analyses other courts have used to assess whether an individual act, or set of 
acts, impermissibly restricts an inmate’s constitutional rights.214 
In order to avoid the confusing, unfavorable results Walia and Asaro 
represent, future defendants should explicitly argue that BOP’s email 
monitoring policy unconstitutionally restricts their right of access to 
counsel.  This clearly should prompt courts to apply either the four-part 
Turner test,215 or an appropriate alternative, such as Procunier216 and its 
progeny, which include Benjamin.  Whether a court would apply one or the 
other in a given Sixth Amendment challenge to BOP’s email monitoring 
policy is arguable.217  For this Note’s purposes, however, the question is 
moot because BOP’s email monitoring policy impermissibly restricts 
inmates’ right of access to counsel under either standard. 
 
 207. Letter Responding in Opposition to the Defendant’s Application at 4, United States 
v. Asaro, No. 1:14-cr-00026 (E.D.N.Y. July 17, 2014) (“[D]efendant’s Sixth Amendment 
argument fails because, to the extent the government’s review of TRULINCS emails at all 
deters [him] from using that mode of communication . . . that inconvenience does not 
unreasonably interfere with [his] ability to consult his attorney . . . in light of the other 
methods of attorney-client communication available” (citing Benjamin v. Fraser, 264 F.3d 
175, 185 (2d Cir. 2001))). 
 208. Benjamin, 264 F.3d at 187 ; see supra notes 179–83 and accompanying text. 
 209. Benjamin, 264 F.3d at 187. 
 210. For a discussion of courts improperly upholding prison regulations pursuant only to 
an alternative means test, see Peter R. Shults, Note, Calling the Supreme Court:  Prisoners’ 
Constitutional Right to Telephone Use, 92 B.U. L. REV. 369, 385 (2012). 
 211. Letter re:  Supplemental Authority As to Tushar Walia, United States v. Walia, No. 
1:14-cr-00213 (E.D.N.Y. July 17, 2014). 
 212. Compare id., with Walia Order, supra note 16, at 29–30. 
 213. Walia Order, supra note 16, at 29–30. 
 214. See supra notes 164–65 and accompanying text. 
 215. See supra notes 168–72. 
 216. See supra note 179 and accompanying text. 
 217. The Court has referred to Turner as a unitary standard. See supra note 168 and 
accompanying text.  As the Benjamin court held, however, Turner is arguably inapposite in 
cases where the rights of pretrial detainees are at issue because it concerned convicted 
prisoners. See supra note 182. 
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In contrast to the Asaro court’s holding, a proper analysis of a prison 
regulation under Benjamin asks if a prison policy “unjustifiably obstructs” 
the availability of pretrial detainees’ representation.  This inquiry analyzes 
this question only in relation to prison administrations’ central objective, 
“safeguarding institutional security.”218  BOP’s email monitoring policy 
fails this test.  As the defense attorneys in Walia rightly observe, in today’s 
American legal profession, email is how business is done.219  In addition, 
for anyone working with an attorney, the ability to communicate 
confidentially is paramount.220  Denying pretrial detainees confidential 
legal email thus plainly obstructs their representation’s availability.221  
Further, security concerns cannot justify this obstruction.  BOP cannot say 
it views confidential inmate-attorney communication as a security threat 
because BOP allows inmates to communicate confidentially with counsel 
via every other communicative media that it offers.222  There is nothing 
unique about email to warrant making it the first exception to this rule.  In 
fact, per BOP’s own reasoning, confidential email is safer than confidential 
legal visits or confidential physical mail because one cannot smuggle 
contraband via email.223  Thus, under Benjamin’s application of Procunier 
and Bell, because BOP’s email monitoring policy obstructs the availability 
of pretrial detainees’ attorneys, and because this obstruction is not 
justifiable as a security measure, it impermissibly restricts pretrial 
detainees’ right of access to counsel. 
If a court chose to apply the four-part Turner test224 in considering 
whether BOP’s email monitoring policy impermissibly restricts inmates’ 
right of access to counsel, it would reach the same result.  Though BOP has 
never had occasion to state in a legal proceeding what their interest is in 
monitoring inmates’ email communication, it is presumably the same 
interest it has in monitoring phone calls and physical mail—i.e., 
maintaining institutional security.225  Maintaining institutional security is a 
legitimate penological interest under Turner.226  With respect to the first 
factor, a court would almost certainly find monitoring inmates’ emails 
rationally related to maintaining institutional security.  In addition, the 
 
 218. See supra notes 180–81 and accompanying text. 
 219. Reply to Response to Motion re:  34 First Motion in Limine re: Defendant Emails to 
Counsel at 3, United States v. Walia, No. 1:14-cr-00213 (E.D.N.Y. July 22, 2014); see also 
ABA LEGAL TECH. RES. CTR, supra note 126. 
 220. See supra Part I.A.1. 
 221. This obstruction is exacerbated by the fact that, as the Ahmed court stated, it can be 
exceedingly difficult to arrange for in-person legal visits or unmonitored phone calls and 
communicating via physical mail is not a viable option in preparing a case. See supra note 
293. 
 222. See supra notes 158–59. 
 223. See supra note 144. 
 224. See supra notes 170–71. 
 225. See FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, BOP PROGRAM STATEMENT, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 1 
(2008), available at http://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5264_008.pdf (noting the 
institutional interest in security as the reason for inmate phone call monitoring); FED. 
BUREAU OF PRISONS, BOP PROGRAM STATEMENT, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 8 (2011), available 
at http://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5265_014.pdf (same with respect to physical mail). 
 226. See supra note 170. 
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second factor also favors BOP because inmates have alternative means of 
exercising their right to communicate confidentially with counsel.227   
Nevertheless, with respect to the third factor, far from having a negative 
effect on institutional security or prison resources, providing inmates 
confidential legal email would benefit each.  As BOP states, it provided 
inmates email to limit the risk of incoming contraband and to ease the 
administrative burden that arranging for phone calls and in-person visits 
creates.228  Enabling inmates to communicate confidentially with counsel 
via email would further both these goals.  Finally, with respect to the fourth 
factor, as the Ahmed court opined, any casual user of Google Mail would 
find it difficult to imagine that BOP could not, at a low cost, simply add a 
feature to TRULINCS that filtered emails to and from inmates’ attorneys of 
record.229 
It is true that monitoring inmate communication is rationally related to 
BOP’s legitimate penological interest in maintaining institutional security, 
and inmates have other means by which to communicate confidentially with 
counsel.  However because providing for confidential legal email would 
have a positive effect on institutional security and prison resources (and 
likely it would be easy to provide), BOP’s email monitoring policy 
impermissibly restricts inmates’ right of access to counsel under Turner. 
V.  CAN FEDERAL COURTS PREVENT PROSECUTORS FROM READING 
INMATES’ LEGAL EMAIL ON NON-CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS? 
Part IV.D argues that BOP’s email monitoring policy impermissibly 
restricts inmates’ Sixth Amendment right of access to counsel.  In the email 
cases, however, BOP’s email monitoring policy was not at issue.230  In 
future litigations, this is likely to remain the case because busy defense 
attorneys probably will continue to make case-by-case arguments regarding 
individual prosecutor’s behavior rather than invest the resources in bringing 
a challenge against BOP.  Moreover, in general, federal courts seek to avoid 
deciding issues on constitutional grounds where possible.231  According to 
this principle of judicial restraint courts often choose not to address 
constitutional issues that have not been explicitly raised by the appropriate 
 
 227. See supra notes 158–59. 
 228. See supra note 144. 
 229. Tr. of Ahmed Conference, supra note 9, at 11–12. 
 230. See supra note 199. 
 231. See, e.g., Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2031 (2011) (noting the “longstanding 
principle of judicial restraint [which] requires that courts avoid reaching constitutional 
questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them” (quoting Lyng v. Northwest Indian 
Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 445 (1988))). See generally 12B JOHN J. 
DVORSKE, TEXAS JURISPRUDENCE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12 (3d. ed. 2014) (subscription 
required) (“A court will not determine a constitutional question unnecessarily or in a case 
that does not present the question with sufficient clarity.”); Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding 
Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L. REV. 1003, 1004–05 (1994) (noting that this principal is 
motivated by concerns “regarding federal courts’ credibility, the final . . . nature of judicial 
review . . . the paramount importance of constitutional adjudication . . . [and] maintaining 
appropriate separation of powers”). 
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parties.232  Thus even if a defense attorney challenged BOP’s email 
monitoring policy, a court would likely hesitate to rule on the issue if BOP 
was not a party, or it felt it had an alternative ground upon which to decide 
the case. 
The question thus arises:  Where the constitutionality of BOP’s email 
monitoring policy is not properly at issue, or a court does not want to decide 
it, is there a legitimate alternative ground upon which a court can prevent a 
prosecutor from reading a defendant’s legal email? 
Part V explains that federal courts can negate the effects of a 
constitutionally questionable prosecutorial practice, without rendering a 
constitutional decision, by exercising their power to regulate prosecutors’ 
behavior.  Part V.A provides background on delegated and non-delegated 
versions of these powers.  Part V.B notes that three defendants in the email 
cases appealed to the courts to use non-delegated variants of this power to 
prevent prosecutors from reading their legal email.  The courts, however, 
rejected these petitions, concluding instead that they lacked the legal basis 
to prevent the prosecutor from doing so.  Two courts, however, sua sponte, 
implicitly employed a non-delegated variant of this power to rule in the 
defendants favor.233  Thus, Part V.B observes, either the four former courts 
were incorrect or the two latter courts exceeded their authority.  
Part V.C asserts that the two courts that implicitly employed their non-
delegated power to regulate prosecutors in order to prevent them from 
reading the defendant’s legal email acted within their authority.  Part V.C 
argues, however, that future courts should prevent prosecutors from reading 
inmates’ legal email pursuant to their delegated authority to enforce Rules 
of Professional Conduct.  This is because explicit rulings pursuant to 
delegated authority raise less separation of powers concerns and have more 
precedential value as compared to implicit rulings pursuant to non-
delegated authority.  Specifically, Part V concludes courts should prevent 
prosecutors from reading inmates’ legal email by enforcing Rule 8.4(d), 
which prohibits attorneys from engaging in conduct prejudicial to the 
administration of justice.234 
A.   Delegated and Non-Delegated Powers 
Federal Courts Use to Regulate Prosecutors 
Unlike state courts, which adopt professional conduct codes,235 federal 
courts have no uniform approach to regulating prosecutors’ behavior.236  
 
 232. Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Federal Court Authority to Regulate Lawyers: 
A Practice in Search of a Theory, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1303, 1326 n.91 (2003); see also, e.g., 
Walia Order, supra note 16, at 30 n.1 (noting that the defendant’s proposed solution to create 
an inmate-attorney email filter on TRULINCS was reasonable but refusing to further discuss 
it because BOP was not a party to the litigation). 
 233. See infra Part II.C. 
 234. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(d) (2014). 
 235. See, e.g., N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2014). 
 236. Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Regulating Federal Prosecutors’ Ethics, 55 
VAND. L. REV. 381, 400 (2002); see also Judith A. McMorrow, The (F)Utility of Rules: 
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They nevertheless routinely do so by enforcing established rules of 
procedure237 or utilizing rulemaking authority Congress explicitly granted 
them.238  In addition, federal courts can enforce the McDade 
Amendment,239 a federal statute authorizing them to apply state ethics rules 
to regulate prosecutorial conduct, even if it is otherwise lawful.240  As 
Professors Zacharias and Green note, when courts exercise their delegated 
powers to regulate prosecutors, it is relatively uncontroversial, because their 
authority to do so is apparent.241  As Zacharias and Green further note, 
however, federal courts also regulate prosecutors pursuant to forms of non-
delegated authority, including setting standards of conduct “indirectly”(i.e. 
informally during proceedings)242 and using their “inherent authority” to 
control their own proceedings243 and “supervisory authority” over the 
administration of the criminal justice system.244  When federal courts 
exercise these powers, it is more controversial because it is unclear whether 
they truly posses them and, if they do, what their scope is.245 
 
Regulating Attorney Conduct in Federal Court Practice, 58 SMU L. REV. 3, 6 (2005) (“No 
single set of rules govern attorney conduct (i.e. ethics) in federal court practice.”). 
 237. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (authorizing federal courts to sanction federal 
prosecutors for improper pleadings). 
 238. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (2012) (allowing district courts to prescribe “rules of 
practice and procedure”); FED. R. CRIM. P. 57 (authorizing federal courts to promulgate local 
court rules for criminal proceedings); United States v. Keane, 375 F. Supp. 1201, 1204 (N.D. 
Ill. 1974) (recognizing discretionary assignment and transfer of cases as proper exercise of 
district courts’ authority under FED. R. CRIM. P. 57). 
 239. 28 U.S.C. § 530B. 
 240. See, e.g., E. & W. Districts of Ky. v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 439 S.W.3d 136, 144 (Ky. 
2014).  This case applied a state ethics opinion pursuant to the McDade Amendment to bar 
prosecutors from including ineffective assistance of counsel waivers in plea agreements 
despite federal courts’ “nearly unanimous” opinion that it is legal to do so. Id.  The ethics 
rule the court adopted was a “formal opinion,” issued by the Kentucky Bar Association, 
which held that this practice violated Kentucky’s professional conduct rule prohibiting 
conflicts of interest. K.Y. RULE OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2014).  The formal opinion 
reasoned that a defense attorney advising a client to accept a plea that includes a waiver of 
his right to appeal for ineffective assistance of counsel is inherently conflicted. Ky. Bar 
Ass’n, 439 S.W.3d at 144. 
 241. See Zacharias & Green, supra note 232, at 1310. 
 242. Zacharias & Green, supra note 236, at 401–02. 
 243. Id. at 407 (citing Chambers v. Nasco, 501 U.S. 32,34–35 (1991) (affirming federal 
courts “inherent power” to, inter alia, sanction attorneys’ bad faith conduct, control 
admission to the bar, punish for contempt, and vacate judgments upon discovery of fraud)). 
 244. Zacharias & Green, supra note 232, at 1314. See generally John Gleeson, 
Supervising Criminal Investigations:  The Proper Scope of the Supervisory Powers of 
Federal Judges, 5 J.L. & POL’Y 423 (1997); Sara Sun Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory 
Power in Criminal Cases:  Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the Authority of the 
Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1433 (1984).  Green and Zacharias also note as non-
delegated sources of judicial authority “the authority of the federal courts to control the 
admission of lawyers to practice before them” and “the inherent authority of federal courts to 
protect their own jurisdiction.” Zacharias & Green, supra note 232, at 1310–14.  These two 
sources of federal courts’ authority to regulate prosecutors are beyond this Note’s scope. 
 245. Zacharias & Green, supra note 232, at 1308–14. 
2160 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
1.   The Delegated Authority of Federal Courts to Regulate Prosecutors 
Through the Rules of Professional Conduct 
Congress has delegated general rulemaking authority to federal courts.246  
Pursuant to this authority, federal courts promulgate “local rules” to 
regulate attorney conduct.247  The vast majority of district courts adopt the 
Rules of Professional Conduct that the state in which they sit employs, 
which typically reflect the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.248  
In addition, in 2000, in the wake of scandals surrounding federal 
prosecutors’ attempts to exempt themselves from state Rules of 
Professional Conduct, Congress enacted the McDade Amendment.249  It is 
titled “Ethical Standards for Attorneys for the Government” and states that 
federal prosecutors will be “subject to State laws and rules and local Federal 
court rules,” wherever they practice.250  After the McDade Amendment, 
even if a district court has not adopted a state rule of professional conduct 
as one of its local rules, it can still enforce any rule of professional conduct 
adopted by the state in which it sits.251 
One question that Zacharias and Green raise, and that is relevant to this 
Note, is how a federal court should proceed when it believes a prosecutor’s 
behavior is plainly wrong but no local rule, state rule of professional 
conduct, or any other authority specifically proscribes it.252  This is the case 
in the email cases.253  One option for courts in this situation is to broadly 
interpret a vague rule of professional conduct such as 8.4(d), which 
prohibits lawyers from engaging in “conduct that is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice.”254  Lower courts’ interpretations of vague Rules 
 
 246. See supra notes 237–38. 
 247. 30 COQUILLETTE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 802.01 (3d ed. 2014). 
 248. Id. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2014). 
 249. 28 U.S.C. § 530B (2012).  Congressman Joseph McDade, who was indicted in 1992 
on five counts of bribery-related charges and eventually acquitted of them all, introduced the 
legislation. Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Uniqueness of Federal Prosecutors, 88 
GEO. L.J. 207, 211 (2000).  During his criminal proceedings, McDade filed numerous 
motions alleging prosecutorial violations of ethics standards. Id. at 212.  Roughly 
contemporaneously to McDade’s criminal proceedings, then-Attorney General Richard 
Thornburgh circulated an internal Department of Justice memorandum that ostensibly held 
Department of Justice attorneys exempt from certain ethics rules adopted by several states. 
Richard L. Thornburgh, Memorandum from Attorney General to all Justice Department 
Litigators 1 (June 8, 1989), reprinted in In re Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478, 489 (D.N.M. 1992). 
 250. 28 U.S.C. § 530B; see, e.g., United States v. Binday, 908 F. Supp. 2d 485, 496 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (analyzing prosecutors behavior under New York Rule of Professional 
Conduct 4.2(a) pursuant to the McDade Amendment). 
 251. See Zacharias & Green, supra note 236, at 418. 
 252. Zacharias & Green, supra note 232, at 1306. 
 253. The rule of professional conduct that comes closest to specifically covering the 
scenario the email cases present is Rule 4.4(b), which provides that a lawyer who 
inadvertently receives a document from the opposing party shall notify the sender. MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b).  This rule does not apply, however, because BOP 
advertently sends inmates’ legal emails to the government. See supra note 10 and 
accompanying text. 
 254. Zacharias & Green, supra note 236, at 394. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 
8.4(d); see, e.g., United States v. Whittaker, 201 F.R.D. 368, 370 (E.D. Pa.), rev’d, 268 F.3d 
185 (3d Cir. 2001) (pursuant to the McDade Amendment, district court disqualified 
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of Professional Conduct, however, can be perceived as inappropriately 
exploiting the rules’ open-textured language to give effect to idiosyncratic 
judicial preferences.255  To this end, in analyzing lower court applications 
of Rules of Professional Conduct, a threshold question that has arisen is 
whether or not the court is enforcing a true “ethics rules,” as opposed to 
effectuating a policy choice.256  The Tenth Circuit argues that ethics rules 
(1) address conduct the legal profession consensually deems inappropriate 
and (2) are directed specifically at attorneys.257  Zacharias and Green 
suggest that ethics rules (1) apply to all lawyers (because rules that apply 
only to a subclass of lawyers are too likely to implicate policy choices) and 
(2) primarily impact lawyers as opposed to institutions.258 
2.   Non-Delegated Authority Federal Courts Use to Regulate Prosecutors 
For a federal court seeking to control a prosecutor’s behavior where no 
local rule, state rule of professional conduct, or any other authority 
specifically proscribes it, an alternative to interpreting a vague rule of 
professional conduct is to act pursuant to one of the non-delegated powers 
federal courts have historically employed to regulate prosecutors’ 
behavior.259  These include their ability to set standards indirectly,260 their 
inherent authority over their own proceedings,261 and their supervisory 
power over the administration of the criminal justice system.262 
a.   Indirect Standard Setting 
As Zacharias and Green note, the most common way federal courts 
regulate prosecutorial behavior is by “setting standards indirectly,” or 
making ad hoc decisions throughout the litigation process that communicate 
the court’s view of appropriate conduct.263  These decisions may be 
memorialized in a written opinion, appear on the record as oral 
 
prosecutor for violating Pennsylvania ethics rule 8.4(d) where the prosecutor sent extremely 
confusing letters to the defendant regarding whether he was or was not a crime suspect); 
Grievance Adm’r v. Fried, 570 N.W.2d 262, 267 & n.11, 267–68 (Mich. 1997) (finding Rule 
8.4(d) applicable where lawyer hired judge’s relative to work on a case to force the judge’s 
recusal). 
 255. See, e.g., United States v. Whittaker, 268 F.3d 185, 195 (3d Cir. 2001) (reversing 
district court’s interpretation of Rule 8.4(d) because it was “unjustified”). 
 256. Zacharias & Green, supra note 232, at 1332. 
 257. United States v. Colo. Supreme Court, 189 F.3d 1281, 1285 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 258. Zacharias & Green, supra note 232, at 1333. 
 259. Id. at 1310–15. 
 260. Zacharias & Green, supra note 236, at 401–03. 
 261. Id. at 407–08. 
 262. Zacharias & Green, supra note 232, at 411–12. 
 263. Zacharias & Green, supra note 236, at 401–03; see, e.g., United States v. Sabri, 973 
F. Supp. 134, 146 (W.D.N.Y. 1996) (suppressing evidence of a conversation based on a 
violation of an ethics rule); United States v. Bazan, 807 F.2d 1200, 1204 (5th Cir. 1986) 
(approving district court’s sustaining of objections to prosecutors’ cross examination); 
United States v. Hernandez, 779 F.2d 456, 458, 461 (8th Cir. 1985) (affirming district 
court’s striking of the prosecutor’s improper remarks). 
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admonitions, or remain unrecorded.264  Though regulating prosecutors in 
this fashion can be effective, as Zacharias and Green point out, it is unclear 
what authority courts act pursuant to when doing so; in turn, because 
federal prosecutors exercise executive discretion, the prospect of courts 
constraining their behavior pursuant to no clear authority raises acute 
separation of powers concerns.265  In the email cases, both courts that 
prevented prosecutors from reading inmates’ legal email did so by issuing 
oral admonitions, pursuant to no clear authority, at pretrial hearings.266 
b.   Inherent Judicial Authority over Their Own Proceedings 
Several defense attorneys in the email cases have unsuccessfully 
petitioned the courts to prevent prosecutors from reading their clients’ legal 
emails by exercising their inherent authority to control their own 
proceedings.267  As Zacharias and Green point out, while this source of 
non-delegated authority is widely recognized, it is generally narrowly 
employed to punish lawyer activity that threatens a court’s efficient 
operations,268 such as bad faith conduct269 or tardiness.270 
c.   Supervisory Authority over the Administration 
of the Criminal Justice System 
The Supreme Court has long recognized federal courts’ power to regulate 
prosecutors’ behavior pursuant to their “supervisory authority over the 
administration of criminal justice.”271  As Zacharias and Green note, 
however, this power’s scope has been subject to much judicial and 
 
 264. Zacharias & Green, supra note 236, at 402. 
 265. Zacharias & Green, supra note 232, at 1313–14.  Professors Zacharias and Green 
suggest that when federal courts are silent as to the authority pursuant to which they are 
controlling lawyers’ behavior, they may believe they are exercising what some courts have 
called a “general ethics authority.”  Zacharias & Green, supra note 232, at 1313–14 (citing 
Weibrecht v. S. Ill. Transfer, Inc., 241 F.3d 875, 878 (7th Cir. 2001) (affirming the district 
courts’ “inherent power and responsibility to supervise the conduct of attorneys admitted to 
practice before it.”)); Whitehouse v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of R.I., 53 F.3d 1349, 
1356 (1st Cir. 1995) (discussing district court’s inherent power to “erec[t] reasonable 
prophylactic rules to regulate perceived abuses by attorneys appearing before the court”). 
 266. See infra notes 287–92 and accompanying text. 
 267. See infra notes 282–83 and accompanying text.  In the two cases where the court 
prevented prosecutors from reading the defendant’s legal email, defense counsel made no 
reference to courts’ non-delegated authority to regulate prosecutors. See infra notes 287–92 
and accompanying text. 
 268. Zacharias & Green, supra note 232, at 1342. 
 269. See, e.g., Chambers v. Nasco, 501 U.S. 32, 50 (1991) (affirming district court’s use 
of its “inherent power” to shift attorneys’ fees because a litigant filed frivolous pleadings and 
thereby delayed the proceeding). 
 270. United States v. Seltzer, 127 F. Supp. 2d 172, 172 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (sanctioning an 
attorney for tardiness pursuant to the court’s “inherent power to manage and control” its own 
proceedings). 
 271. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 349 (1943); see also United States v. 
Williams, 504 U.S. 36 (1992); Bank of N.S. v. United States, 487 U.S. 250 (1988); United 
States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983). 
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scholarly scrutiny.272  In McNabb v. United States,273 the Court stated that 
the power should be used to “maintain[] civilized standards of procedure 
and evidence,” and exercised it to exclude confessions obtained coercively 
though not illegally.274 As commentators argue, however, McNabb 
represents an era where courts applied this power too liberally,275 as broad 
judicial discretion to regulate law enforcement practices smacks of 
interbranch encroachment.276  Most recently, the Court has cabined its 
use.277  Judge John Gleeson suggests that it should be used only to remedy 
“violations of federal law in the evidence gathering process that actually 
prejudice the defendants.”278  Perhaps unsurprisingly, then, in the email 
cases only one defendant referred to this power, and implicitly at that. 
B.   The Courts Divide on Whether They Have Regulatory Authority to 
Prevent Prosecutors from Reading the Defendants’ Legal Emails 
In Fumo, defense counsel never explicitly contested the government’s 
use of their client’s legal emails as evidence and the court thus admitted 
them with little question.279  In National Urological Group, Asaro, and 
Walia, upon concluding that the defendants’ legal emails were not 
privileged, and that the prosecutors reading them did not impermissibly 
restrict the defendants’ constitutional rights, the courts permitted the 
 
 272. Zacharias & Green, supra note 232, at 1311; see, e.g., Beale, supra note 244; 
Gleeson, supra note 244. 
 273. 318 U.S. 332 (1943). 
 274. Id. at 338–40 (citing Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 239 (1941)). 
 275. Bennet L. Gershman, Supervisory Power of the New York Courts, 14 PACE. L. REV. 
41, 47 (1994) (“[T]he rise and fall of supervisory power resembles a parabolic arc, beginning 
with McNabb, reaching its crest . . . and then descending precipitously); Zacharias & Green, 
supra note 236, at 412 (“McNabb . . . provided an open-ended definition of the 
power . . . .  Recent cases, however, have suggested that [it] may have gone too far . . . .”). 
 276. See Gleeson, supra note 244, at 428 (stating that “[judicial] attempts to supervise 
investigations . . . interfer[es] with the appropriate divisions of powers among the branches 
of government.”); see also Beale, supra note 244, at 1522 (“[S]eparation of powers dictates 
that federal prosecutors . . . should perform their duties subject only to the requirements 
imposed by the federal Constitution and statutes, not subject to the federal judiciary’s 
preference for particular policies . . . .”). 
 277. United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36 (1992) (reversing a district court order, 
pursuant to its supervisory powers, that the government must present substantial exculpatory 
evidence to the grand jury).  The Court noted the grand jury’s institutional independence and 
federal courts’ corresponding lack of competence to prescribe rules governing it. Id. at 49–
50. 
 278. See Gleeson, supra note 244, at 466–67. 
 279. See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text.  Defense counsel did, however, 
characterize the government’s behavior as an “Orwellian spectacle” that was “beneath the 
dignity” of the court. Letter Brief in Response to Gov’t’s Reply Memorandum Regarding 
Resentencing at 2, United States v. Luchko, No. 2:06-cr-00319 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 2011).  
This language closely recalls that used by the court in McNabb. See supra note 273–274 and 
accompanying text.  Defense counsel was thus, arguably, implicitly asking the court to 
prevent the government from using the defendant’s email pursuant to its supervisory 
authority over the administration of the criminal justice system. See generally supra Part 
IV.A.2.c. 
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prosecutors to read the defendants’ legal email.280  In allowing this, 
however, all courts but the National Urological Group court expressed 
significant discomfort with the practice, as well as sympathy for the 
defendants’ inability to email their counsel confidentially.281 
Presumably in hope of appealing to this sympathy, the defendants in 
Asaro and Walia advanced several policy arguments regarding the benefits 
confidential legal email provides.282  Based on these arguments, they 
impelled the courts to exercise their inherent power to control their own 
proceedings to prevent the prosecutor from reading their clients’ legal 
email, notwithstanding the prosecutors’ ability to do so lawfully.283  In 
Walia, the defense attorneys argued additionally that the inability to send 
confidential legal email made it impossible for them to comply with their 
obligations under Rule of Professional Conduct 1.4,284 inviting the court to 
exercise its delegated authority to enforce Rules of Professional Conduct.285  
Despite their avowed sympathy for the defendants’ position, however, the 
Walia and Asaro courts chose not to respond to any of these arguments, 
concluding instead that there was no “legal basis” to prohibit the 
government from reviewing the defendants’ legal emails.286 
In Saade, however, despite never adjudging the practice illegal, the court 
prevented the prosecutor from reviewing the defendant’s legal email.287  
Upon discussing the issue at a pretrial hearing the court offered the 
prosecutor, what it called, an “off the cuff reaction”:  the court stated that 
prosecutors should not be able to read inmate-attorney email because they 
 
 280. FTC v. Nat’l Urological Grp., Inc., No. 1:04-CV-3294-CAP, 2012 WL 171621, at *1 
(N.D. Ga. Jan. 20, 2012); Asaro Order, supra note 16, at 2; Walia Order, supra note 16, at 
30. 
 281. Transcript Sentencing Hearing Held on 11/10/11 at 47–48, Luchko, No. 2:06-cr-
00319 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 17, 2011), ECF No. 926 (expressing the court’s intuitive dislike of the 
government “snooping around” on Fumo’s “private conversations”); Asaro Order, supra 
note 16, at 2 (“[I]t would be a welcome development for BOP to improve TRULINCS so 
that attorney-client communications could be easily separated  . . . and subject to 
protection.”); Walia Order, supra note 16 at 29–30 (noting that the Court does not 
necessarily “agree with the position of the [government]” to review inmates’ legal email and 
expressing sympathy for the burden that the inability to email counsel confidentially places 
on the defendant). 
 282. First Walia Motion, supra note 58, at 3 (noting that there is “no meaningful 
substitute” for email in today’s workplace, that using physical mail and arranging for legal 
phone calls and visit are all very inefficient, and that public defenders have a particularly 
demanding caseload); DiFiore Letter, supra note 44, at 4 (same). 
 283. DiFiore Letter, supra note 44, at 3; First Walia Motion, supra note 58, at 2. 
 284. First Walia Motion, supra note 58, at 2–3.  Rule 1.4 enumerates a lawyer’s duties to, 
inter alia, “reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the client’s 
objectives are to be accomplished,” and “keep the client reasonably informed about the 
status of the matter.”  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4; see also N.Y. RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4. 
 285. See supra Part I.C.2. 
 286. Asaro Order, supra note 16, at 2; Walia Order, supra note 16, at 30. 
 287. Transcript of Proceedings As to Maroun Sade Held on 9/26/2011 at 7, United States 
v. Saade, No. 1:11-cr-00111 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2011).  This type of indirect standard 
setting is what Professors Zacharias and Green have argued is the most common form of 
power federal courts employ to regulate federal prosecutors’ behavior. See supra Part 
V.A.2.a. 
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cannot eavesdrop on inmate-attorney meetings or phone calls, or read 
inmates’ legal mail, and it should not “make a difference whether the mode 
of communication is more modern or more traditional.”288  Shortly 
thereafter the prosecutor volunteered to refrain from reading the defendant’s 
legal emails.289 
In Ahmed, the court conceded that the defendant’s legal emails were 
unprivileged.290  In addition, it never addressed either the defendant’s 
argument that in reading them the prosecutor impermissibly restricted his 
right of access to counsel, or the defendant’s request for the court to 
exercise its inherent powers to control its own proceedings to prevent this 
behavior.291  The court nevertheless issued an oral ruling, pursuant to no 
clear authority, expressly prohibiting the government from reading the 
defendant’s legal emails.292 
Unlike other courts treating this issue, the Ahmed court expressed a high 
level of knowledge concerning the difficulty defendants and defense 
attorneys face in arranging for in-person legal visits and unmonitored phone 
calls at BOP facilities.293  In addition, the court took special exception with 
the government’s contention that it was only choosing to review inmate-
attorney email because it could no longer afford to implement taint teams, 
not because it sought to gain a strategic advantage.294  Finally, the court 
noted in its opinion that the government could easily update TRULINCS to 
 
 288. Transcript of Proceedings As to Maroun Sade Held on 9/26/2011 at 7, Saade, No. 
1:11-cr-00111.  Though the court did not explain its reasoning further, as Professor Orin 
Kerr highlights, this type of “technology neutral” argument has been made by courts and 
commentators in the related context of evolving technology as it applies to the Fourth 
Amendment. See generally Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. 
L. REV. 561 (2009). See, e.g., United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 285–86 (6th Cir. 
2010) (holding that “it would defy common sense to afford emails lesser Fourth Amendment 
protection” than traditional mail). 
 289. Transcript of Proceedings As to Maroun Saade Held on 9/26/2011 at 10, Saade, No. 
1:11-cr-00111. 
 290. Tr. of Ahmed Conference, supra note 9, at 5 (“There are certainly 
admonitions . . . that the [emails] are not privileged . . . .  But that’s not really what’s at the 
heart of the issue here.”). 
 291. Compare Irizarry Letter, supra note 53, with Tr. of Ahmed Conference, supra note 
9. 
 292. Tr. of Ahmed Conference, supra note 9, at 21 (“I’m going to tell you what we’re 
going to do in this case.  In this case, the government will be precluded from looking at any 
of the attorney-client e-mails, period.”). 
 293. Id. at 19 (stating “I’ve had sit-downs with the warden at the [BOP facility where 
defendant was detained] to cut down on the amount of wait time that the attorneys have 
when they get there” and “[i]t can take up to . . . a month to arrange an unmonitored phone 
call”). 
 294. Id. at 17–18 (“You’re going to tell me you don’t want to know what your 
adversary’s strategy is?  What kind of litigator are you then?  Give me a break . . . .  The 
executive budget is far bigger than the judiciary’s budget, okay, and the defense budget.  So 
forgive me if I’m not overly sympathetic to the issue of the government having to put up a 
taint team in order to avoid having to look at attorney-client e-mails.”). 
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provide for a filtering function to segregate email between inmates and their 
attorneys of record.295 
In sum, courts have unanimously held that inmates’ legal emails sent via 
TRULINCS are unprivileged,296 and no court has held that prosecutors 
reading these emails impermissibly restricts inmates’ right of access to 
counsel or right of access to the courts.297  As a result, despite expressing 
various levels of sympathy for the defense position, the Fumo, National 
Urological Group, Asaro, and Walia courts held that there was no legal 
basis to prohibit the government from reading the defendants’ legal email.  
The Saade and Ahmed courts, however, did just that, though pursuant to no 
clear authority.  Thus, either the Fumo, National Urological Group, Asaro, 
and Walia courts were incorrect, or the Saade and Ahmed courts acted 
beyond their authority’s scope. 
C.   Federal Courts Should Prevent Prosecutors from Reading Inmates’ 
Legal Email By Enforcing Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(d) 
The email cases evoked four forms of federal courts’ authority to regulate 
federal prosecutors:  their ability to enforce Rules of Professional 
Conduct,298 their ability to set standards indirectly,299 their inherent power 
to manage their own proceedings,300 and their supervisory authority over 
the administration of the criminal justice system.301  The ability to enforce 
Rules of Professional Conduct is the most appropriate form of this power 
for a federal court to exercise in preventing a prosecutor from reading a 
defendant’s legal email. 
Though effective in practice, as in Saade and Ahmed, judicial acts that set 
standards indirectly lack precedential value and raise separation of powers 
concerns, especially when they constrain executive discretion.302  
Preventing prosecutors from reading defendants’ legal email pursuant to 
this power is therefore not optimal. 
With regard to courts’ inherent power to manage their proceedings, it is 
unsurprising that, despite defendants’ enjoinders, no court exercised this 
authority to prevent prosecutors from reading defendants’ legal email.303  It 
is unsurprising because this power’s function is to ensure the efficiency of 
day-to-day courtroom operations, not to second guess lawful executive 
evidence-gathering practices.304 
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Because barring judicially disfavored executive evidence-gathering 
practices was once exactly what federal courts used their supervisory 
authority over the criminal justice system to do,305 preventing prosecutors 
from reading defendants’ legal email pursuant to this authority may appear 
appropriate.  As Judge Gleeson and others have argued persuasively, 
however, liberal use of this authority smacks of inter-branch 
encroachment.306  Pursuant to Judge Gleeson’s analysis of what constitutes 
an appropriate exercise of this power,307 it is improper for federal courts to 
prevent prosecutors from reading defendants’ legal email pursuant to it 
because this behavior is not a clear violation of federal law.308 
Unlike the three aforementioned non-delegated powers federal courts 
exercise to regulate prosecutors’ behavior, Congress explicitly has 
authorized federal courts to regulate federal prosecutors by enforcing Rules 
of Professional Conduct.309  Judicial rulings pursuant to this authority, 
assuming they are proper, therefore raise fewer separation of powers 
concerns because they are grounded in congressionally delegated authority. 
To be proper, such rulings must function as ethics rules—as opposed to 
judicial policy preferences310—that either specifically cover the facts at 
issue or can be reasonably interpreted to do so.311 
Under the tests of the Tenth Circuit and Zacharias and Green,312 a rule of 
professional conduct preventing prosecutors from reading inmates’ legal 
email is an ethics rule.  A rule preventing this behavior could apply to all 
lawyers, including, as in Hatcher,313 defense attorneys seeking to eavesdrop 
on cooperating witnesses’ legal communication.  In addition, it would 
address conduct that the legal profession consensually disfavors.314  Finally, 
it would only affect attorney conduct, as neither BOP nor any other 
institution would have to alter its practices. 
Having determined that a rule preventing federal prosecutors from 
reading inmates’ legal email would qualify as an ethics rule, the next 
question is whether there is a rule of professional conduct that specifically 
prohibits this behavior or can be reasonably interpreted to.  It is possible 
that state bar associations will publish formal ethics opinions that speak 
directly to the issue of prosecutors reading inmates’ legal email.  If this 
occurs, a federal court could simply choose to adopt it, as was the case in 
E.& W. Districts of Kentucky v. Kentucky Bar Ass’n.315  This is not likely to 
occur anytime soon, however, because, as of this writing, only three states 
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offer inmates the ability to send and receive email,316 presumably making 
this an issue of little interest to state bar associations. 
Because it is unlikely that a state bar association will issue an opinion 
specifically addressing whether prosecutors can read inmates’ legal email, a 
federal court seeking to prevent this practice on non-constitutional grounds 
will have to apply a rule of professional conduct that can reasonably be 
interpreted as proscribing it.  As Zacharias and Green note, federal courts 
often apply Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(d), which prohibits conduct 
“prejudicial to the administration of justice,” to sanction or bar conduct that 
is “plainly wrong” but not otherwise specifically proscribed.317  Rule 8.4(d) 
is the most appropriate rule by which to prevent prosecutors from reading 
inmates’ legal email. 
Although Rule 8.4(d)’s open-textured wording has been understandably 
criticized for being overinclusive, and thus raising due process concerns 
because attorneys cannot predict how it will apply to them,318 preventing 
federal prosecutors from reading inmates’ legal email is within its scope.  
As one set of commentators writes, the debate leading to the adoption of 
Rule 8.4(d) by the ABA House of Delegates explained that it should only 
apply to violations of clear norms and conventions of practice.319  In other 
words, it should prohibit conduct that is “plainly wrong” in the profession’s 
eyes, not just in the eyes of individual judges.  Because prosecutors reading 
defendants’ legal emails chills defendants’ ability to communicate 
confidentially with counsel—an ability long recognized as critical to the 
adversary system—all the parties litigating this issue, including the 
government itself, have recognized its inappropriateness.320  Prosecutors 
reading defendants’ legal email is thus precisely the type of conduct, 
viewed as normatively improper within the profession but difficult to 
foresee, that Rule 8.4(d)’s open-textured, flexible language was meant to 
proscribe. 
CONCLUSION 
The American legal profession recognizes the ability to communicate 
confidentially with an attorney as a—if not the—critical component of the 
adversary system.  As such, it is unsurprising that prosecutors reading 
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inmates’ unprivileged legal email, despite this practice’s legality, is 
behavior that no one, not even prosecutors themselves, truly approves of.  
At least one advocacy group has begun to pressure BOP to alter 
TRULINCS in order to provide for unmonitored inmate-attorney email.321  
Fortunately, because BOP provides for confidential legal visits, mail, and 
phone calls it seems likely that it is only a matter of time before BOP 
provides inmates the ability to email their attorneys confidentially. 
Until BOP provides inmates’ confidential legal email, this Note argues 
that prosecutors should abstain from reading inmates’ legal email as a 
matter of self-regulation.  It asserts that, in cases where they do not, there 
are legal bases to prevent them.  Prisoners’ rights advocates should 
challenge BOP’s email monitoring policy under the theory that it 
unconstitutionally restricts inmates’ right of access to counsel, and courts 
should uphold this challenge.  Where BOP’s email monitoring policy is not 
at issue, or where a court seeks to avoid a constitutional decision, courts 
should prevent prosecutors from reading inmates’ legal email by invoking 
Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(d). 
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